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China's Network Justice
Benjamin Liebman* and Tim Wu**#
INTRODUCTION
China's Internet revolution has set off a furious debate in the West.
Optimists from Thomas Friedman to Bill Clinton have predicted the crumbling
of the Chinese Party-state ("Party-state"), while pessimists suggest even greater
state control. But a far less discussed and researched subject is the effect of
China's Internet revolution on its domestic institutions. This Article, the product
of extensive interviews across China, asks a new and different question. What
has China's Internet revolution meant for its legal system? What does cheaper, if
not free, speech mean for Chinese judges?
The broader goal of this Article is to better understand the relationship
between how a legal system functions and how judges communicate, both with
each other and with other parties, including the media, the public, and political
actors. Information transmission is an important but poorly understood part of
any legal system. A precedent system, amid briefs, and the rules on ex parte
contacts all serve to regulate how parties in a system communicate and what
kind of information "counts." Media and political pressure cannot help but
affect a legal system. In the words of Ethan Katsh, "Law is an organism whose
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lifeblood is information and media of communication are the veins and
arteries. '
The People's Republic of China stands as a useful case to study the effects
of changing means of communications on a legal system. Over the last fifteen
years the Chinese legal system has undergone important transformations in the
costs and means of disseminating information-the consequence both of new
technologies and of the simultaneous commercialization of the Chinese media.
This has led to changes in both the information available to judges and the
attention paid to the judiciary's decisions. Such changes have come precisely as
the Chinese courts are undergoing dramatic reforms, the stated aim of which is
to make courts more competent, fair, and authoritative actors in the Chinese
political system.
While necessarily an exercise in extrapolation, we can take several
predictions from Western communications theory as to the likely impact of
changing communications technology for Chinese courts. First, the optimistic
side of American communications theory suggests that greater exposure to
information and ease of communications will usually be good for a political
system, including its legal system. While primarily writing about the United
States, writers like Yochai Benkler, Eugene Volokh, and Glenn Reynolds have
argued that cheaper mass communications technology will improve government
and lead to healthier political systems.2 As Benkler writes, "we are [now]
witnessing a fundamental change in how individuals can interact with their
democracy and experience their role as citizens."3
Our study of the Chinese judiciary4 reveals some evidence to support the
optimistic theory-exciting examples of Internet pressure that have uncovered
injustice and forced courts and Chinese Communist Party ("Party") officials to
take action. But overall, we find a mixed picture that includes both optimistic,
headline-grabbing stories and decidedly ambiguous developments.
Second, a different line of American scholars, writing in the 1990s, argued
generally that the effects of electronic publishing and communications would be
as profound for legal systems as the invention of printing itself. "Broad change
I M. Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law 3-16 (Oxford 1989).
2 See generally Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and
Freedom (Yale 2006), available online at <http://www.benkler.org/ Benkler
Wealth_Of_Networks.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007); Glenn Reynolds, An Army of Davids: How
Markets and Technology Empower Ordinary People to Beat Big Me&a, Big Government, and Other Goliaths
(Nelson Current 2006); see also Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Yale L J
1805 (1995).
3 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 272 (cited in note 2).
4 In China, references to "the judiciary" and "judicial" encompass both the courts and the
procuratorates. In this Article, we use "judiciary" and "judicial" to refer to the courts alone.
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is occurring to the law," wrote Ethan Katsh in 1989, "to what it is and how it
works, and that these changes are linked to the appearance of new methods of
storing, processing and communicating information."' While this thesis seems
weakly supported in the US context,6 it may find greater strength in China. In
other words, it is in the Chinese legal system where judges are treating electronic
sources of information in ways different than they have treated print sources. It
may be in China where some of the communications-driven changes predicted
by Katsh and others have found a home.
We present three groups of findings. The first, under the heading Net
Justice, are developments in communications between the judiciary and the
media, the public, and the Party officials who oversee both the courts and the
media. The media and the public's newfound ease in ascertaining what judges
are doing has already had important benefits. In cases such as that of Sun
Zhigang-a university graduate brutally murdered in a detention center for
migrant workers-it is clear that Internet and media pressure led to both
judicial action and salutary institutional reform. But on the flip side, the Internet
has also been used to generate extreme public pressure and consequent political
intervention in reaction to certain types of inflammatory cases. That is, of
course, not an entirely new development. The Chinese legal system has long
been characterized by Party-state intervention in important or sensitive cases.
The difference is the rise of cases where public reaction and outrage online leads
officials to intervene and predetermine or change judicial action. In one of the
examples discussed below, Internet pressure resulted in a convicted gangster, Liu
Yong, having the reduction of his sentence from death to life in prison reversed
and being swiftly put to death. The same efficiencies of communication that
make exposing unfair or unjust decisions easier also facilitate, and make more
likely, public pressure and political intervention.
The second set of findings is under Judicial Networks, which discusses
developments in the communications patterns among judges. There are signs of
important changes in how Chinese judges communicate with each other.
Chinese judges have traditionally made decisions based on consultation that is
mostly vertical-with "adjudication committees" within the courts that resolve
difficult or sensitive cases or between judges, court presidents, Communist Party
5 Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Tranformiation of Law at 3 (cited in note 1). See generally Ethan
Katsh, Law in a Digital World (Oxford 1995); Richard J. Ross, Communications Revolulions and Legal
Culture: An Elusive Relationship, 27 Law & Soc Inquiry 637 (2002); Ronald K. L. Collins and David
M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 Stan L Rev 509 (1992).
6 See generally Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World, vii-
ix (Oxford 2006) (questioning impact on some of law's operation from changing
communications).
7 See Part II.
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Political-Legal Committees, and higher courts. Judges have had limited abilities
to consult with other members of the judiciary outside their court, other than
those in directly superior courts, and sometimes have had limited access to
relevant laws and other legal materials. Today, much is changing, particularly
through use of the Internet and other communications technologies. Chinese
judges increasingly communicate and consult along horizontal lines, including
with other judges, and also with academics and the public. Many judges use the
Internet from home or web cafes to do extra research, finding either Chinese or
foreign cases. Judges report an emerging and informal system of quasi-precedent
made possible by horizontal networking. Judges' decisions are also much better
publicized through a variety of means, including the Internet, and as a result are
subject to more external criticism.
Third, under the section Innovative Uses, our study shows that some Chinese
judges have begun to use the Internet as a judicial tool in ways that are unusual
and perhaps unprecedented in other parts of the world. For example, some
judges use chat rooms and email in the course of deciding hard cases,
communicating with other judges, academics, and even the public. Other judges
and courts maintain blogs that comment on cases, and make their case decisions
available to the public and other judges. These types of behavior are relatively
unique and may lead to distinctly Chinese judicial communications practices.
The study of China's judiciary yields important and general insights into the
poorly understood relationship between judicial power and judicial speech. As
generations of American scholars have suggested, the power of the judiciary to
act independently from other branches depends on the availability and
acceptability of higher principles to which judges may appeal. Whether it be to
Herbert Wechsler's "neutral principles," to tradition, or to accepted moral
doctrine contemplated by others,8 the degree to which society and other
government actors accept the principles to which judges appeal does much to
determine the judiciary's power.
The changes in communications affect both the accountability and the
authority of the Chinese judiciary. The claims to legitimacy are strengthened
through access to the laws themselves, and through the ease of forming judicial
networks. As horizontal, judge-to-judge communications become easier and
cheaper, judges can make new claims to the authority to decide cases according
to cases already decided. Networked judges, like common-law judges, also gain
8 See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prindpks of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1,
(1959); Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 49-65
(Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
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the ability to learn from other judges.9 The development of horizontal judicial
networking may be a crucial means for strengthening the autonomy and
professional identity of courts.
But there is a flip side: cheap communications also affect how accountable
judges are, in every meaning of that term. Cheaper speech makes it easier to
attack the judiciary and diminish its legitimacy. This is particularly true where, as
in China, speech is cheap but not free. In the Chinese example, we see an
extreme version-the "Internet manhunt" leading to political intervention-
with important lessons for the rest of the world. The dominant writing on
Internet criticism in the United States stresses improvements in government and
media accountability. Yet not all criticism is socially useful, and when criticism is
used as a political weapon against an already weak judiciary it does not improve
governance but endangers progress toward a rule of law system. At its worst,
and when supported by the state, cheap mass criticism can cause judges to
become unwilling to make decisions that run the risk of inflaming the public,
thereby causing a surrender of judicial authority to the vicissitudes of public
opinion.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I introduces theoretical
background on the relationship between communications technologies and
government and judicial behavior. Part II is a study of the Chinese judiciary. Part
III discusses the relationship between speech and judicial legitimacy.
I. SPEECH AND INFORMATION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM
A. FREE SPEECH, INFORMATION, AND GOVERNMENT
Since the early twentieth century, the relationship among communications
technologies, government, and free speech has been a field of intense interest.
The rise of the telegraph, telephone, and the mass media of the twentieth
century led writers from Charles Cooley through Wilbur Schramm and Marshall
McCullen to forecast great changes in human governance. ° This is the field of
"communications studies," which in its earliest days tended to optimism. Charles
Cooley wrote with moving confidence that technologies such as the telegraph
might "make it possible for society to be organized more and more on the
higher faculties of man, on intelligence and sympathy, rather than authority,
9 See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 66-103 (Princeton 2004) (describing
global trend toward judicial networking).
10 The field of early communications studies is far too vast to describe here. For an introduction, see
Wilbur Lang Schramm, The Beginnings of Communicaion Study in America: A Personal Memoir (Sage
1997).
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caste, and routine."" These ideas reflected both a faith in technological progress
and the more general belief in the power of free speech to improve society
embodied in the American First Amendment.
One hundred years later, the optimism of the early 1900s was reborn
during the Internet revolution of the 1990s. Consistent with the American free
speech tradition, commentary has been mostly buoyant. It suggests, with a few
exceptions, that cheaper speech will yield a more participatory democratic
culture, more attention to public opinion, and generally better and more
responsive governments.
A small group of writers in the late 1980s and 1990s confronted the
specific impact of changing communications technologies on the operation of
legal systems. 12 Included in such arguments is the recognition that a prior change
in technology-the birth of printing-played an important role in shaping
Anglo-American legal systems, and in forming a common law system of
precedent. 3 Ethan Katsh's writing is the exemplar. He characterized the
American legal system of the 1990s as deeply integrated with, and reflective of,
print media. "It is not 'fine print,"' wrote Katsh, "that characterizes the law, but
print itself. Print affected the organization, growth and distribution of legal
information."'" "Law," writes Katsh, "has been conditioned in many ways by
various characteristics and constraints of traditional modes of communication,
particularly print." Katsh predicted dramatic changes in the law's operation
produced by the different property of the texts themselves. "The electronic
media are not to be considered merely as more powerful versions of print. They
have different mechanisms for transmitting and processing information, some of
which will pressure the law to change course and become a different and not
simply a more efficient institution."' 5
In the 2000s, a different and independent body of scholarship promoted
the possibilities of Internet communications for improving the nature of
national deliberation, in particular by supplementing or replacing traditional
media as the primary source of scrutiny of government. One of the first to
present what we can now call "blogger theory" was Professor Eugene Volokh,
11 Charles Horton Cooley, On Sef and Sodal OtganiZation 103 (Chicago 1998).
12 See note 2.
13 M. Ethan Katsh, Communications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions: The New Media and the Future of
Law, 8 Nova L J 631, 631 (1984) ("The spread of printing led to fundamental changes in legal
doctrines, legal institutions, legal values and attitudes about law."); Ross, 27 Law & Soc Inquiry
640-42 (cited in note 5) (summarizing arguments that the development of printing facilitated the
evolution of common law precedent).
14 Katsh, Electronic Media, Introduction at 14 (cited in note 1).
15 Id at 13.
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in Cheap Speech and What It Will Do.6 Yochai Benkler presented a full treatment
of this thesis in his book, The Wealth of Networks,17 as did writer Dan Gilmour in
We the Media8 and law professor and blogger Glenn Reynolds in An Army of
Davids.'9
These latter authors present an attractive thesis: in a country where every
citizen has the means to act as a critic, the result will be a more responsive
government. Roughly, the premise is that the marketplace of ideas has been
hindered by barriers to entry. The high costs of communications have stood in
the way of regular citizens participating in political discourse, leaving
participation to specialized entities such as professional interest groups and the
professional media. But since the 1990s, the decreased costs of communication
made possible by technological changes have facilitated greater access to the
political process, making it possible for amateurs and regular citizens to be
involved. As Benkler writes, the rise of the Internet has "fundamentally altered
the capacity of individuals, acting alone or with others, to be active participants
in the public sphere as opposed to its passive readers, listeners, or viewers .... It
,~20is in this sense that the Internet democratizes.
The dissent from this view has come in clearest form from Professor Cass
Sunstein in his books Republic.com and Echo Chambers.2' Sunstein argues that
technologies such as the Internet are not aiding national political discourse but
splintering it. "If Republicans are talking only with Republicans, if Democrats
are talking primarily with Democrats, if members of the religious right speak
mostly to each other, and if radical feminists talk largely to radical feminists,
there is a potential for the development of different forms of extremism, and for
16 See generally Volokh, 104 Yale L J (cited in note 2).
17 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 272 (cited in note 2).
18 Dan Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the Peoplefor the People (O'Reilly 2004).
19 Reynolds, An Army of Davids (cited in note 2).
20 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 212, 272 (cited in note 2). Writers like Benkler focus on
Internet-based, mass political movements that make use of network technology. For example,
Benkler tells the story of how a variety of Internet activists managed to make the security of
Diebold voting machines a matter of public concern in the 2000s, an issue in which the mass
media was originally uninterested. Id at 225-33. Other well-discussed examples are the Internet-
driven fundraising behind the Howard Dean campaign in the 2004 election, the exposure of fraud
behind various anti-Bush war records, and the purge of Trent Lott from the Senate leadership. Id
at 258, 262-65. The general tenor is to suggest that, but for a more democratic "citizen media,"
history would have taken a much different course.
21 Cass R. Sunstein, Republiccorn (Princeton 2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Echo Chambers: Bush v. Gore,
Impeachment, and Beyond (Princeton 2001), available online at <http://press.princeton.edu/
sunstein/echo.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in
Cyberipace, 104 Yale LJ 1757, 1785-87 (1995).
Summer 2007
China' s Network Justice I jebman & Wu
Chicago Journal of International Law
profound mutual misunderstandings with individuals outside the group."22 A glut
of information and the ease of listening to only what you agree with, argues
Sunstein, will lead to national factions that generally ignore one another-the
fractionalization of the Republic.
23
China's own Internet revolution has touched off a similar debate. Many
argued that, in Thomas Friedman's words, "the Internet and globalization, are
acting like nutcrackers to open societies." Bill Clinton argued that the Internet
will "democratize opportunity in the world in a way that has never been the case
in all of human history,"24 while George W. Bush argued that, in China, the
Internet takes "freedom's genie.., out of the bottle." However, so far the
political change forecast in the 1990s has been far less than predicted. In
previous work, we have explored many of the ways the Party-state has managed
to maintain a grip on political power despite the dramatic changes in
communications. We have suggested that, in some ways, the Party-state has
honed its use and control of information flows for political purposes. 2
Nonetheless, writers from Friedman through Nicolas Kristof continue to argue
that the Party-state's grip will not survive the Internet revolution. As Kristof
wrote in a 2005 column, Death by a Thousand Blogs, "the Chinese leadership.., is
digging the Communist Party's grave, by giving the Chinese people
broadband.,
26
In this Article we come at these debates from a new angle by providing
detailed evidence of what is actually happening in China. What much of the
present debate misses is what happens when speech becomes far cheaper, yet still
not free-where some forms of criticism are allowed, but not others.27 In our
example of China, direct criticism of Party rule is off limits, yet critiques of the
courts are more acceptable. The consequence, as we will see, is a directed form
of criticism whose social function is not well appreciated by our existing and
dominant means of understanding speech.
22 Sunstein, Echo Chambers at 5 (cited in note 21).
23 See Federalist 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77 (Mentor 1961).
24 William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President to Business Leaders, and Officials and Emplyees of Gateway
Computers (Sept 4, 1998), available online at <http://www.clintonfoundation.org /legacy/090498-
speech-by-president-to-officials-of-gateway-computers.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
25 See Goldsmith and Wu, Who Controls the Internet at 87-104 (cited in note 6); Benjamin L. Liebman,
Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 Colum L Rev 1, 59-64, 82-92
(2005).
26 Nicholas D. Kristof, Death by a Thousand Blogs, NY Times A21 (May 24, 2005).
27 For more general commentary on the impact of the Intemet, see Anupam Chander, Whose
Republic?, 69 U Chi L Rev 1479 (2002); Thomas S. Ulen, On the Line: A Review ofRepublic.com by
Cass Sunstein, 2001 J L Tech & Poly 317 (2001); Mark S. Nadel, Customized News Services and
Extremist Enclaves in Republic.com, 54 Stan L Rev 831, 857 (2001).
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This study is also an opportunity to examine the impact of focused
criticism not on government in general, but on the courts specifically. Previous
writing in this area, with some exceptions,2 8 has not devoted much attention to
the intricate relationship between mass, inexpert participation made possible by
the Internet, and the functioning of a legal system. The American free speech
case law does concede the need for restrictions on speech within the courts, and
in exceptional cases for restrictions on media coverage of court proceedings, but
the effects of cheaper speech on the judiciary itself are not as well understood.
There is a simple explanation for this. In the United States, the most obvious
consequences of the Internet revolution have been for the media and business.
Conversely, the operation of the judiciary has been far less affected. This may
reflect the American judiciary's particular tradition of independence and relative
isolation from the direct influence of public opinion. Aside from better legal
blogging, an occasional URL citation in Supreme Court opinions, and greater
competition for Westiaw and Lexis, it may be that few of the decision-making
methods of courts have changed, so far.
But it is unsurprising that different countries are affected differently by a
major change in the costs of communications. The effects of the Internet on the
Chinese legal system are arguably far more profound than in Europe or the
United States. Yet since these developments are largely not discussed in the
West, we find ourselves writing on new ground, with regard to both China and
the broader question of how new technologies may be affecting judicial
decision-making.
Judges are decision-makers, and to pursue the question of how information
affects judging, the tools of information economics will prove useful. For that
reason, we turn now to a review of some of the relevant literature on
information-transmission and decision-making.
B. THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND
DECISION-MAKING
Fredrich Hayek's 1945 work The Use of Knowledge in Society is a starting point
for much of what has followed on the relevance of information to
decision-making. 29 Hayek argued that the advantages of the free market over a
planned economy were largely related to how a free market makes use of
information. The free market, he pointed out, is not obviously more efficient
than a centralized, planned production, since competition tends to be
disorganized, duplicative, and wasteful. Instead, said Hayek, the problem with
28 See M. Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World 172-94 (cited in note 5).
29 F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Socety, 35 Am Econ Rev 519 (1945).
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models of centralized planning is informational: no single actor can possess
sufficient information to make all the decisions necessary in a complex
economy. Conversely, the market's decentralized decisions about production,
while certainly prone to error and waste, are at least made on the basis of much
more of the relevant information-leading to, in the aggregate, better decision-
making. Market prices, in Hayek's view, were valuable pieces of public
information about resource scarcity that a centralized planner had difficulty
replicating.
The study of decision-making given imperfect information has developed
into an entire field since Hayek's time, often called "information economics."'o
The tools of information economics are valuable for understanding the
importance of communications within a legal system.
First, in the information economics literature, a major distinction is made
between decision structures that are more horizontal or "polyarchical" in nature,
and those that are more vertical, or "hierarchical."'" That difference in decision
structures is, for example, an essential difference between a planned and market
economy. Economists Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph Stiglitz originally focused on
the differences between hierarchies and polyarchies for purposes of error-
correction. But other writers, including economist Jeremy Stein, write about the
differences in information transmission in vertically-and horizontally-
organized institutions.
30 Since Hayek's time the relationship between information-transmission and decision-making has
received much attention-only the briefest of summaries will be attempted here. Michael Spence,
Joseph Stiglitz, and others have developed the field of information economics, which emphasizes
economic decision-making under conditions of imperfect information. See generally, Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 Am Econ Rev 460 (2002). That
has led to work on information asymmetries as a form of market failure (and signaling as a
remedy), the relative performance of decentralized and centralized decision makers, the
phenomenon of "herding behavior," and other interactions between information and the market.
See, for example, Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a Communication Network,
109 Q J Econ 809 (1994); Paul R. Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Oeganizaion &
Management 113-16 (Prentice Hall 1992); Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz, TheQualiy of Managers
in Centralized versus Decentralized Osanizations, 106 Q J Econ 289 (1991); David S. Scharfstein and
Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 Am Econ Rev 465 (1990); Raaj Kumar Sah and
Joseph Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Poyarchies, 76 Am Econ Rev 716
(1984). Versions of these ideas have reached the public in widely-read works such as James
Surowiecki's The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom
Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations (Doubleday 2004).
31 See generally Sah and Stiglitz, 106 QJ Econ 289 (cited in note 30); Sah and Stiglitz, 76 Am Econ
Rev 716 (cited in note 30).
32 See Jeremy C. Stein, Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized Versus Hierarchical
Firms, 57J Fin 1891, 1891-93 (2002) (arguing that information that might be easier to transmit, or
"hard" information, like numbers, can be handled well by a hierarchy, while "soft" information,
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One type of decentralized decision-making system of great interest is
common-law courts. First, Hayek himself in 1960 argued that the English legal
system was a superior institution to the French, based on its decentralized
decision-making.33 Later, Richard Posner described the common law litigation
process as a source of rules-and viewed judges as decentralized decision-
makers acting on the basis of local information, whose collective decision-
making might, over time, reach efficient results.34 The challenges to Posner's
thesis are well-known.3" Nonetheless, the theory of common-law "learning" and
the potential of moving toward better rules has been influential.36
A second and particularly useful tool from information economics is the
theory of the "rational herd" or "information cascade." The herding literature is
interested in the puzzles of mass behavior, like fashion trends, and mass
mistakes, such as stock market bubbles or the tendency of mutual fund
managers to under-perform the market. These theories explain what happens
when decision-makers weigh not only their own judgment, but the collective
volume of the decisions of others.37 The phenomenon of rational herding
identifies situations where decisions are decreasingly driven by one's own
information, and increasingly driven by the actions of others.
The notion of rational herding has obvious implications for a legal system.
The prospect is that judges may similarly, and rationally, herd around a bad or
such as a subjective assessment of managerial ability, might be better processed by decentralized
actors).
33 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Lbery 194-96 (Chicago 1960).
34 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 320-28 (Little Brown 1973). See also Paul H.
Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J Legal Stud 51 (1977); George L. Priest, The Common
Law Process and the Selection oEffident Ru/es, 6 J Legal Stud 65 (1977).
35 One obvious point is that judges who choose the wrong rules do not, like firms, go out of
business, and few today seem to believe that all common law rules are efficient. See, for example,
Priest, 6 J Legal Stud at 75-81 (cited in note 34); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Notes on the Logic of Legal
Change, in David Braybrooke, ed, Social Rules: Origin; Character; Logic; Change 169, 169-78 (Westview
1996); Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evoluion of Legal Rules, 80 Georgetown LJ 583 (1992).
36 Paul Mahoney, for example, has sought to demonstrate empirically that common-law, precedent-
based systems create faster economic growth than civil systems. His data show, on average,
slightly more than 0.5 percent faster growth in the world's common-law countries during the
period 1962-1990. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be
Right, 30J Legal Stud 503, 516 (2001). Mahoney controlled for starting per capita GDP, secondary
school enrollment, population growth, investment, and other factors. Id at 521.
37 For example, imagine that Restaurants A and B serve similar quality food, and that ten people,
who know nothing about the restaurants, arrive one by one. The first sequential decision-maker
Dl might decide randomly to go to restaurant B. The next, D2, if he weights Dl's decision
heavily, might make the same choice. Over time, restaurant B may be full, a powerful signal of
quality having nothing to do with the actual quality of the food. For a more in-depth overview,
see Sushi] Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of Others:
Conformity, Fads, and Information Cascades, 12J Econ Perspectives 151 (Summer 1998).
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suboptimal rule, yet due to the weight of cases behind the rule, be increasingly
hesitant to run against the crowd. Economists Andrew Daughety and Jennifer F.
Reinganum, in their paper on horizontal judicial herding, gave the example of
Eastern Enteprises v Apfel, where six circuit courts had agreed a law was
constitutional but were later reversed by the Supreme Court.38 The example
showed that, perhaps due to herding effects, errors might remain long
uncorrected in a common-law system.
The prospect of judicial herding may seem like a serious challenge to the
utility of a common-law system. But as we discuss in Part III, doing what other
judges have done in similar cases may also be desirable-for it is a means for
judges to build their own political power. Herding may also be another way to
say "following a rule."39 As Eric Talley has written, healthy legal systems aim for
a balance between blind obedience and learning.40 They employ devices, like life
tenure, or the technique of distinguishing cases, that allow judges to break from
sub-optimal rules when they deem it necessary. An ideal system ought
simultaneously to provide predictability and the capacity to adapt, despite the
apparent contradiction.
These tools from information economics literature help us understand
what is at stake when we study communications within a judicial system. We
now turn to our empirical study of recent developments in the communications
practices in the Chinese judiciary.
II. CHINESE JUDGES AND THE INTERNET
Before beginning our analysis of the impact of the Internet on the Chinese
courts, we offer a brief primer in the functioning of China's courts and the
Chinese media.41 China has a lot of judges-most estimates say about 200,000,
or roughly twice the number of lawyers. Until recently, relatively few Chinese
judges had significant legal training: reports in mid-2005 stated that, for the first
time, more than 50 percent of judges were university graduates. A decade earlier
the figure was just 12 percent. In the past, many judges were retired military
officials or government cadres. As of 2002, however, new judges are required to
38 Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and
Herding Behavior Ij Courts, 1 Am L & Econ Rev 158, 159 (1999) (citing Eastern Enteprises v Apfeil,
524 US 498 (1998)).
39 See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 BU L Rev 813, 822 (1998).
40 See generally Eric Talley, Precedenial Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S Cal L Rev 87 (1999).
41 This discussion is based on Benjamin L. Liebman, China's Courts: Restricted Reform, China Q
(forthcoming 2007); Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation through Intimidation: An Empirical Account of
Defamation Ligation in China, 47 Harv Intl L J 33 (2006); Liebman, 105 Colum L Rev 1 (cited in
note 25).
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be university graduates and to pass the difficult national bar exam (which has a
pass rate of about 10 percent). The Supreme People's Court ("SPC") has also
devoted enormous resources to training existing judges. Many of those who lack
formal training in law have been required to attend night school or special
training programs. Older judges who lack legal training are being pushed into
early retirement, or are sometimes no longer permitted to hear cases.
For much of the reform period (1978-present), China's courts have
remained relatively minor actors in the Chinese political system. Courts lack
significant power over other state institutions and have no formal powers of
judicial review. Under the Chinese Constitution, only the National People's
Congress and its Standing Committee have the power to interpret laws or the
Constitution, though in practice the SPC plays an important role in interpreting
the law.
China's legal system is national and unitary, with four levels of courts. Most
first instance cases are brought in basic-level courts in counties or in districts
within cities. Appeals from such cases go to intermediate courts in
municipalities, or shi. Intermediate courts also hear certain categories of first
instance cases-generally those involving large sums of money or serious crimes,
but also sometimes cases that are politically sensitive. Provincial high courts (and
the high courts of municipalities with provincial rank, such as Beijing and
Shanghai) oversee the courts in their provinces, hear appeals from intermediate
courts, and have the power to rehear cases brought in all lower courts in their
jurisdiction. The SPC, with hundreds of judges, manages the court bureaucracy,
hears appeals and rehearings, and issues a large volume of interpretive
documents intended to guide lower courts in the application of the law. These
range from formal interpretations of laws, which often read like statutes
themselves, to responses to courts regarding the handling of individual cases
pending in lower courts.
Court caseloads have grown significantly since the beginning of legal
reforms in the late 1970s-with some stating that China is now experiencing a
"litigation explosion." Over the last five years the total number of cases heard in
China has held steady at about eight million a year. Courts continue to be one of
many state institutions with responsibility for resolving disputes and hearing
grievances.
Problems in the Chinese courts have received widespread attention in both
the Chinese and international media. Corruption is said to be common, courts
often lack the power to enforce their decisions, and external intervention in
pending cases is widespread. Intervention comes from a range of sources. Local
Party officials frequently pressure the courts in cases involving key local
interests. Courts find it hard to resist such pressure, in particular because judges
depend on the local Party for their jobs and salaries. Court appointments (and
removals from office) are generally made by the local Party branch and
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government, and court budgets are dependent on local governments.
Communist Party Political-Legal Committees, which include senior police, court,
procuratorate, justice bureau, and Party officials, exist at each level of the
Party-state, and discuss (and sometimes issue written suggestions in) major cases.
People's Congresses-China's legislatures-have the formal power to
"supervise" the courts, and may from time to time issue requests or views to
courts regarding cases. Individual officials also may intervene in cases of
particular concern, issuing written instructions to the courts regarding pending
cases, or sometimes simply discussing cases with court presidents.
In contrast to the courts, the Chinese media have long occupied a
privileged position in the Chinese political system. The media serve as both the
mouthpiece and the "eyes and ears" of the Party-not only writing public
reports that appear in print or in broadcasts, but also "internal reports." Internal
reports contain information for officials of a particular rank, and are deemed not
suitable for public dissemination. This means that when media views conflict
with those in the courts, Party officials tend to side with the media.
Commercialization of the Chinese media in the 1990s resulted in major
changes. Thousands of new publications appeared, mostly offshoots of
traditional Party mouthpiece newspapers. These commercialized papers compete
fiercely with one another, often by providing sensational or hard-hitting reports.
They also generate profits for their parent publications, which continue in their
"official" or "mouthpiece" propaganda roles. The growth of the Internet
brought further competition, with papers and web portals now competing to
attract readers online as well as in print, often by providing content that skirts
the edges of what is permissible.
China's media regulatory system, although challenged by the growth of
commercialized media and the Internet, remains fundamentally unchanged.
Regulations restrict who can enter the market-ensuring that the overwhelming
majority of publications and broadcasters in China are state-controlled (albeit
often in corporatized form). The Party's Central Propaganda Department
("CPD") oversees all media content, relying on both circulars that prohibit
certain content, and also on a system of post-publication sanctions that target
those who go beyond permissible boundaries. Local propaganda departments at
the provincial, municipal, and local level likewise oversee content in local media,
often supplementing CPD restrictions with their own local restrictions on
content.
The job of the CPD and local and provincial propaganda departments has
become much more difficult in recent years. The commercialization of the
media means that there is vastly more content available than at any prior point in
Chinese history. And the growth of the Internet, as we will show, means that
news spreads much more quickly than before-often before propaganda
departments can react to impose bans. Chinese authorities have not been passive
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in response to such challenges. As has been widely reported in the Western
media, China devotes substantial resources to monitoring and controlling the
Internet. This includes ordering websites to prohibit discussion of certain topics,
or to remove controversial articles. Sites that go too far are shut down. One
result is that self-censorship by commercial Internet news providers is perhaps
the most effective means by which authorities maintain control over reporting
and discussion of controversial topics online.
The following sections set forth our empirical findings. They are based on
extensive review of Chinese writings and on interviews with more than one
hundred scholars, reporters, lawyers, and judges about the impact of the Internet
on China's courts. Interviews with judges were conducted in three provinces in
China and in two cities with provincial rank. Judges surveyed ranged from those
sitting on provincial high courts, to well-educated judges in major cities, to
judges in small county towns who lacked formal training in law.42 We freely
admit the limitations of our methodology: those likely to interact with us are
most likely younger, more liberal, and more likely to use the Internet, than many
others in China. Nevertheless, their descriptions of the impact of the Internet
provide a crucial base for understanding the important changes we believe are
taking place in China's courts.
A. EXTERNAL PRESSURES
China's own Internet revolution has made it much easier for the public, the
media, and the Party-state to become aware of and criticize the Chinese legal
system and its courts. Although that may sound good, the results, from a
rule-of-law perspective, have both attractive and less attractive aspects.
Sometimes cheaper information has meant better accountability and
pressure for important reform. As we discuss below, courts or legal institutions
that are neglecting or deliberately abusing their duties can be exposed and
subjected to public or media pressure. Bad decisions, corrupt judges, and unjust
procedures are sometimes brought to light by Internet communications, leading
to important reforms.
Yet the same mechanism can create excessive pressure on the courts. As
we discuss, unpopular decisions can attract a strong public reaction-the
"Internet manhunt"-and subsequent political intervention to quell public
42 All interviews were conducted by Liebman. All interviewees were promised complete anonymity,
and thus we identify neither their name nor the location in which the interviews took place.
[Editorial note: In order to accommodate this anonymity, the Chicago Journal of International
Law has made an exception to its policy of independently reviewing all cited sources, instead
relying on the authors to ensure the proper use of these interviews. Copies of all interviews are on
file with the authors.]
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outrage. The Internet plays a crucial role in making both Party leadership and
the courts aware of public opinion, which is important in a system in which
other outlets for public opinion are restricted. But the effect may be more mixed
in a system where only one segment of public opinion is being heard, where the
media play an active role in generating popular outrage online, and when such
opinion is significantly restricted due to Party control and oversight of the
media.
1. Greater Accountability
In 2003, Sun Zhigang, a university graduate working as a graphic designer
in the southern city of Guangzhou, was detained by police for failing to have the
temporary residence permits required of migrant workers. Three days after his
arrest Sun was beaten to death while in a local detention center for migrants.43
More than a month after Sun's killing, on April 25, 2003, the leading
commercial newspaper in Guangdong Province, Southern Metropolitan Daily,
carried a report on the case, entitled "Only Missing a Temporary Residence
Permit, College Graduate Is Beaten to Death." Local Communist Party
Propaganda Department officials immediately banned any further discussion of
the case in the local media. But the ban was ineffective. The Southern Metropolitan
Daily article had already been posted to the paper's website on the day of
publication, and had been subsequently reposted to numerous other websites. It
even showed up on the website of the People's Daily, the mouthpiece of the Party.
Within hours, Internet discussion forums filled with discussion of the
case. 44 Noting the article in the People's Daily, numerous other newspapers
subsequently reported on the case, carrying follow-up stories that were also
posted and reposted online. On May 13, three weeks after the original report
and following weeks of online discussion of the case, authorities announced that
they had detained thirteen suspects. A month later, twelve defendants were
43 For details of the case, see Liebman, 105 Colum L Rev at 82-91 (cited in note 25).
4 Southern Weekend: Arices on Peopk's Daily Online Strengthen the Determination to Crack the Sun Zhigang
Case (Nan Fang Zhou Mo: Renmin Wang WenZhang Zengiia Le Zhenpo Sun Zhigang An De JueXin), S
Weekend (Nan Fang Zhoumo) (une 6, 2003), available online at <http://past.people.com.cn/
GB/news/8410/20030606/1010138.html> (Chinese) (on file with author) (discussing the
Internet's role in the case); Human Rights Watch, The Voice of China: The Sun Zhigang Affair
(Zhongguo Zhi Sheng: Sun Zhigang Shiian) (Apr 29, 2003), available online at
<http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/china/beijing08/voicesch.htm> (Chinese) (on file with
author) (stating that tens of thousands of postings protesting the case appeared, on all popular
websites in China, and including examples of such postings). See also Teng Biao, The Sun Zhigang
Affair: Intelligence, Media and Power (Sun Zhigang Shyiian: Zhishi, Mejie Yu Quanlh), Law Thinker Web
(Falii Sixiang Wang) (Oct 25, 2004), available online at <http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=
2703> (Chinese) (on file with author) (describing online discussions of the case and the important
role of the Internet).
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convicted for their roles in the case, and the two "primary culprits" were
sentenced to death and life in prison, respectively.4"
The impact of the case-and of the Internet---did not end with the trial.
Following the arrests in May, a group of academics and journalists launched an
assault on the detention system, known as Custody and Repatriation, under
which Sun had been apprehended. In an effort coordinated with print and
online media, two groups of lawyers and scholars issued petitions calling on the
system to be abolished because it was unconstitutional. The petitions themselves
were not printed in full in the official media, but were widely available online.46
Media coverage highlighted their demands, leading to online discussion and
reposting of the petition.4' Reports also noted some of the widespread abuses in
the system, including numerous reports of other inmates also being murdered
while in detention. Websites provided significantly wider-ranging discussions of
the case than those appearing in the traditional media.48
Shortly after the June trial of the defendants in the Sun Zhigang case,
China's State Council announced that the Custody and Repatriation System was
being scrapped and replaced with a system designed to shift the emphasis from
punishing migrants to assisting them by establishing "a caring assistance system"
45 In addition, twenty-three officials were given administrative sanctions for their mishandling of the
case.
46 For discussion of the petitions, see Guo Lang, Internet Growth in China: Drivers, Actors and
Impact on Public Opinion (Zhongguo Hulianwang De FaZhan: Dongh" Yji Dui Minyi De Yingxiang),
China Internet Research Project (Zhongguo Hulianwang Yanjiu Xiangmu) (Apr 26, 2004),
available online at <http://www.wipchina.org/?pl=content&p2=05013000345> (Chinese) (on
file with author); Teng Biao, The Sun Zhigang Affair (Sun Zhigang Shijian) (cited in note 44); Cui Li,
Five Experts' Petiions to the NPC to Initiate Special Investigation Proceedings Regarding Sun Zhigang Case
(Wu Zhuanjia fiu Sun Zhigang An Tiqing Renda Qidong Tebie Diaocha Chengxu), China Youth Daily
(Zhongguo Qingnian Bao) (May 28, 2003), available online at <http://www.npcnews.com.cn
/gb/paper7/30/cdassOO0700001/hwz236693.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author); Three Ciizens
Petition to the NPC Calling for Constitutional Review of the Custody and Repatriaion Provisions (San Gongmin
Shangshu Renda Jianyi Dui Shourong Banfa Jinxing Weixian Shencha), China Youth Daily (Zhongguo
Qingnian Bao) (May 16, 2003), available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/shizheng/20030516/993964.html> (Chinese) (on file with author).
47 For discussion of the Internet's role in the case, see Ouyang Bin, Internet's Impact on the Environment
of Chinese Soiety (Huianwang Chongji Zhongguo Shehui Shengtai), Phoenix TV Net (Fenghuang Wang),
available online at <http://www.phoenixtv.com.cn/home/phoenixweekly/141 /30page.html>
(Chinese) (on file with author); Guo Lang, Internet Growth in China (cited in note 46).
48 For example, a well-known Peking University professor engaged in a pointed two-hour online
discussion on the case; the transcript is available at He Weifang, Development of Rule of Law in China
as Reflected by the Sun Zhigang Affair (Cong Sun Zhigang Shiian Kan Zhongguo Fa.hi Fa.han), People's
Daily Online (Renmin Wang) (June 10, 2003), available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/shehui/46/20030610/1013342.html> (on file with author).
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of "aid stations" that provide migrants with shelter and food.49 Although official
comments stated that the changes simply reflected changed conditions in China
while others involved in the drafting of the new regulations noted that the
changes had been contemplated since before the incident, the link between the
Sun Zhigang case and ensuing public outcry was clear.
The Sun Zhigang case is an example of how the growth of investigative
journalism in China, in particular among the market-driven newspapers that
developed throughout the 1990s, combined with the Internet, is resulting in
much greater attention to law and the legal system than at any prior point in
Chinese history.5 ° Prior to commercialization of the media, press reports on the
courts tended to be declaratory statements of the outcomes of cases, often
written by court officials. Increased competition among the print media brought
greater scrutiny to the courts and to legal issues more generally, along with
greater critical coverage of decisions perceived as unjust. Yet prior to the growth
of the Internet, discussions of cases in one region, even in the commercialized
media, often went unnoticed elsewhere, and it was relatively easy for Propaganda
Department officials to terminate discussion of cases by banning further media
reports. A daring newspaper, such as Southern Weekend, might expose gross
injustice, but officials could move swiftly to terminate follow-up reports.
Otherwise, courts often operated in relative obscurity. Decisions might be
reported in a local newspaper, or not at all.
That is changing. As the Sun Zhigang case shows, thanks mainly to the
Internet and the birth of competing Internet news sites, cases that might once
have been invisible, or have disappeared, can receive national attention,
sometimes virtually instantly. In other cases, websites and web discussion
forums spread news of cases where local Propaganda Department officials have
instructed the official media not to report on such cases. In addition to the
famous Sun Zhigang case, numerous other cases of alleged injustice have
attracted widespread coverage and discussion on the Internet.
In 1994 a woman named Zhang Zaiyu disappeared. Zhang's family accused
her husband, She Xianglin, of killing her. When police found the body of an
unidentified woman, which relatives identified as Zhang, in a nearby water
tower, they charged She with murder. After She confessed to the murder,
allegedly under torture, he was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Hubei
49 670,000 Urban Vagrants Get Assistance in China, People's Daily Online (Dec 23, 2004), available
online at <http://english.people.com.cn/200412/23/eng2004l 2 2 3-168443.html> (on file with
author); Vagrants Get Aid as New System Begins in China, People's Daily Online (Aug 1, 2003),
available online at <http://engish.people.com.cn/200308/01/eng20030801_121435.shtml> (on
file with author).
so For discussion of the development of the commercialized media in China and the rise of
investigative journalism, see Liebman, 105 Colum L Rev at 23-41 (cited in note 25).
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Province High People's Court sent the case back for retrial due to insufficient
evidence, and She was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for intentional
homicide."'
Eleven years later, on March 28, 2005, Zhang Zaiyu reappeared alive and
married to a different man.52 An initial report on Zhang's reappearance ran in a
local paper in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei Province. Following the report, local
authorities banned further reporting on the case pending an official
investigation, and instructed the media to use only an officially approved report
on the case. 3 But news quickly spread online and to other newspapers. A few
weeks later, on April 15, She was released from custody. Media coverage may
not have been solely responsible for She being freed-authorities reopened the
case immediately after Zhang returned home. But such coverage did appear to
assist She in obtaining 460,000 yuan (approximately $57,000) in compensation
for his wrongful incarceration. The settlement was reported to be the largest
from the state in Chinese history.4
As in the Sun Zhigang case, the media linked the case to broader problems
in the Chinese criminal justice system. One report on the She case argued such
wrongful conviction cases reflected the pressure placed on local authorities to
solve cases and assuage popular anger.55 Official explanations, in contrast,
blamed the case on historical circumstances and the weakness of the legal system
at the time of She's conviction and praised the efforts of local authorities to
resolve the matter.5 6
51 From Nie Shubin to She Xianglin: Correcting Wrongful Convictions Cannot Rely Only on Chance (Cong Nie
Shubin Dao She Xianglin: Cuoan Zhaoxue Buneng Jiwang Yu Ouran) (Apr 3, 2005), available online at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-04/03/content_2779236.htm> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
52 Id.
53 See LU Zongshu, Journalist's Investigation: The Wrongful Conviction of She Xiangin for 'Killing his Wife"
(Ji.he Diaocha: She Xianglin "Sha Qi" Cuo An), People's Daily Online (Renmin Wang) (July 27,
2005), available online at <http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/47850/47855/3572767.
html> (Chinese) (on file with author).
54 Hu Bing and Yan Hua, She Xiangfin Ohtains 460,000 Yuan in Con7pensation (She Xianglin Nadao 46
Wan Peichang He Buchang Kuan), China Court Web (Zhongguo Fayuan Wang) (Sept 3, 2005),
available online at <http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=176316> (Chinese) (on file
with author).
55 From Nie Shubin to She Xianglin (cited in note 51).
56 Jingmen for the First Time Summari es Publicy the Lessons from the She Xianglin Case: The Crucial Reason Is
the Presumpton of Guilt (Jingmen Shouci Gongkai Zongiie She Xianglin An Jiaoxun: Youzei Tuiding Shi
Shouyin), Xinhua Net (Xinhua Wang) (July 19, 2005), available online at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-07/19/content_3239399.htm> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
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Another illustrative example is the wrongful conviction case of Nie Shubin.
In 1994, a court in Hebei Province found Nie Shubin guilty of rape and murder.
Nie was executed the following year. Eleven years later, in 2005, a second man
named Wang Shujin confessed to the original rape and murder.
The confession story was originally reported in March by a reporter from
the Henan Commercial News, reprinted in the Beling News and followed-up by a
report in Southern Weekend. 7 All of the reports subsequently were posted and
circulated online. Local authorities refused to reopen Nie's case, and the media
began to complain of a cover-up. A report in Southern Weekend, for example,
asked why the local authorities failed to release details of their investigation into
the case, and inquired whether the case would "disappear."58 The report also
noted that all details about the case had been removed from the police website.59
Likewise, a report in the Beling News, issued on March 15, questioned why the
police, procuratorate, and court involved in the case had refused to take any
action or to comment on the case.60 Following the report, propaganda
department officials apparently ordered the media not to carry further reports on
the case.6 However, reports continued to circulate, both in print and online,
suggesting that the ban was either very limited or was widely ignored.62
57 'The Case of Nie Shubin's Wrongul Execution" Is Pendin and the Public Calls Out for an External
Investigation in Order to Avoid "Compromising" ('Nie Shubin Yuansha An" Xuan Er Wei Jue, Fang
"Goudui" GongZhong Yu Yidi Diaocha), S Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) (Mar 24, 2005), available
online at <http://www.southcn.com/weekend/commend/200503240006.htm> (Chinese) (on
file with author).
58 Zhao Ling, Nie Shubin Case WillAbsolutey Not End Up with No Outcome (Nie Shubin An Juedui Buhui
Bu Liao Liao Zhe), S Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) (Apr 28, 2005), available online at
<http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/ZM/20050428/xw/fz/200504280005.asp> (Chinese) (on
file with author).
59 Previously, the Guangpin county public security website had included details of the case in a
prominent place. Id.
60 Real Rapist and Murderer Caught, An Innocent Youth Was Executed Wrongfuly 10 Years Ago (Qiangiian
Sharen An Zhendao Lou Wang Wugu Qingnian 10 Nian Qian Bei Zhixing Sixing), Beijing News (Xin
Jing Bao) (Mar 15, 2005), available online at <http://news.hexun.com/detail.aspx?lm= 1 697&id=
1068197> (Chinese) (on file with author). See also Zhao Ling, Nie Shubin Case (cited in note 58);
'Nie Shubin Case" Needs More of the Publics Continuing and Intense Attention ('Nie Shubin An" Geng
Xuyao Gongzhong Haobu Songxie De Jinmi Guan:hu), S Met Daily (Nanfang Dushi Bao) (Apr 22,
2005), available online at <http://www.southcn.com/opinion/politics/200504220359.htm>
(Chinese) (on file with author) (discussing the case).
61 The Central Propaganda Department Urgenty Circulates Notice Banning Reports of the Case of Nie Shubin's
Wrongful Execution (Zhongxuanbu Jinji Tong.hi JinZhi Baodao Nie Shubin Bei Cuosha An), Boxun
Newsnet (Boxun Xinwen Wang) (Mar 21, 2005), available online at <http://www.peacehal.com/
news/gb/china/2005/03/200503211409.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author); Fu Yingji, Twelve
Big Pieces of News Deleted from the Chinese Internet in 2005 (2005 Nian Zhongguo Wangluo Shier Da Bei
Shan Xinwen) (Dec 31, 2005), available online at <http://forum.chinesenewsnet.com/archive/
index.php/t-19858.htmP> (Chinese) (on file with author) and <http://www.wangbingzhang.us/
forum/wbz/messages/4381.html> (on file with author). The two sources that reported on the
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On the same day the Being News report appeared, the Hebei Province
High People's Court launched an investigation into the case. The Court did so
after written instruction from leaders of the Political-Legal Committee of the
Provincial Communist Party.63 Although rumors later circulated online that an
internal investigation had determined that the case had not been incorrectly
decided,64 as of early 2007 no official decision had been announced.65
Nie Shubin's family may still be waiting for justice. But, as with the Sun
Zhigang case, the most important effect of the Nie and She cases was not the
outcome of the individual cases, but their effect on national policy. At the end of
2005, China's SPC announced that it was revising China's procedures for
handling capital cases. Under the new rules, final review of all capital cases will
be conducted by the SPC. In the past, such review power was delegated to
provincial high courts-which were also responsible for hearing appeals of
capital cases. The new procedures create a third tier of review. In addition, the
SPC rules require appeals in capital cases to be heard in open court.6 Although
pressure for such changes, both domestic and international, had been building
for some time, the wave of public attention to the Nie, She, and other wrongful
ban are overseas media and may have overstated the reach of the ban. Although both reports
stated that the CPD had imposed a ban, it appears more likely that any ban was imposed by local,
not national, propaganda department officials. For a collection of commentary on the case, see
Xiao Han, Pay Attention to Nie Shubin's Wrong/ Adjudicated Death Penaly Case (Guan hu Nie Shubin
Mengyuan Sixing An), China Review Web (Zhong Pin Wang) (Mar 22, 2004), available online at
<http://www.china-review.com/tbzt/ 050322bianzhean.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author).
62 'The Case of Nie Shubin's Wrongful Execution" (cited in note 57); Zhao Ling, Nie Shubin Case (cited in
note 58); Qian Haoping, Hebei Re-investgates the Nie Shubin Case, Stating They Will Reveal the Truth in
the Shortest Time Possible (Hebei Chongxin Diaocha Nie Shubin An. Cheng Zuiduan Shilian Nei Huan
Shishi Zhenxiang), Beijing News (Xin Jing Bao) (Mar 18, 2005), available online at
<http://news.hexun.com/detil.aspx?lm=1716&jid=1073687> (Chinese) (on file with author).
63 Id.
64 Hebei Makes Determinalion that the Nie Shubin Case 'Was Not Wronguly Decided" (Hebei Zuochu Nie
Shubin An ' Bushi Cuoan" De Rending), Strait Met Newspaper (Haixia Dushi Bao) (Apr 22,
2005), available online at <http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/ 2005/04/200504220259.
shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author).
65 Zhong Kai, Southern Metropolitan Daily: Are All the Orginal Investigation Records of Nie Case Required
(Nanfang Dushi Bao: Feyao Zhaoqi Nie An De Yuanshi Xing:hen Jilu Ma), S Met Daily (Nanfang
Dushi Bao) (Jan 7, 2006), available online at <http://news.163.com/06/0107/01/
26R26J510001124T.html> (Chinese) (on file with author). One report stated that the family of
Nie Shubin had heard that officials had determined that there was no error, but had not received
any formal notification to this effect. "The Nie Shubin Rape and Murder Case' Was Not Wrongfuly
Decided" (" Nie Shubin Qiangnian Sharen An' Bushi Cuoan'), Guangzhou Daily (Guangzhou Ribao)
(Apr 20, 2005), available online at <http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/gb/content/2005-04/20/
content_2023768.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author).
66 Yearender. Media's Frequent Exposure of Unjust Cases Promotes China's Judicial Reform, People's Daily
Online (Dec 19, 2005), available online at <http://english.people.com.cn/200512/19/
eng20051219_229034.html> (on file with author).
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conviction cases during 2005 appeared to be a crucial factor leading the SPC to
make the changes.67
Most such cases follow a pattern similar to those of the Sun Zhigang, She,
and Nie cases. Traditional print media initially report on the case, the report is
posted to the media's official web page, and then is reposted to numerous other
websites. The articles create widespread discussion online, in particular in web
discussion forums.68 Such discussion and coverage encourages follow-up reports
in the print media, reports that are subsequently reposted to the Internet.
The interaction between print and online media is important. Chinese
regulations on the Internet restrict the ability of Internet providers to create their
own news content. With just a few exceptions, only traditional media are
permitted to generate news stories.69 The number of websites legally qualified to
print original news is unclear; a 2004 report stated that 163 websites were legally
qualified to publish news, while another 1400 were permitted to offer "news
service"-which generally means they are permitted to reprint articles that have
already appeared in the official media.7° Websites with the ability to generate
original news content are generally those linked to national, provincial, and local
Party mouthpiece newspapers. 7' Another important difference between the
traditional media and online media is that the online media are more likely to
67 Legal Daily: Clicking on Four Ke Legal Words in the Year 2005 (Fazhi Ribao: Dianji 2005 Nian Si Da
Fali Guanjian C) (an 10, 2006), available online at <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-01-
10/08317940186s.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author) (discussing the effect of the Nie and She
cases).
68 In some cases in which initial reports in the official media are blocked, information on the cases is
first posted to websites. Once sufficient public discussion has been generated, and official
attitudes toward the case have become clear, the official media will then report on the case.
Ouyang Bin, Internet's Impact (cited in note 47).
69 The Information Office of the State Council and the Ministry of Information Industry, Provisions
for the Administration of Internet News Information Services (Hulianwang Xinwen Xinxi Fuvu Guanli
Guiding, Order No 37 (Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi, Xinxi Chanye Bu Di 37 Hao Ling) (Sept
25, 2005), available online at <http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=
chl&Gid=60145> (Chinese) (on file with author) (stating that only websites linked to traditional
media are permitted to generate their own news stories); The Information Office of the State
Council & the Ministry of Information Industry (Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi & Xinxi
Chanye Bu), Tevporary Provisions for the Administration of Internet Websites' Service of Posting News
Information (Hulian WangZhan Congshi DengZai Xinwen Yewu Guanli Zanxing Guiding (Nov 7, 2000),
available online at <http://info.people.com.cn/EComClnt/index2.jsp> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
70 Shi Jiangmin, 'Tnternet Broadcast" Officially Published in Beijing ('Wangluo Chuanbo" Zai Jing Zhengshi
Chuangkan), People's Daily Online (Renmin Wang) (Apr 20, 2004), available online at
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/14737/22035/2458358.html> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
71 Id (listing examples); Liebman, 105 Colum L Rev at 60-61 (cited in note 25).
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carry commentaries on cases while they are pending. The traditional media
usually wait to discuss cases until decisions have been made.72
An additional crucial feature of the Sun Zhigang, She, and Nie cases is that
the Internet facilitates coverage by the media in jurisdictions other than those in
which a case occurred. In the Nie case, what might have been a local issue was
reported by media from Beijing, Henan, and Guangdong. The significance lies in
the fact that in many cases local propaganda authorities will block local media
from reporting on local cases.
Another recent example of such trans-provincial news coverage is the
defamation action brought against the authors of the best-selling--but
subsequently banned-book, An Investigation into China's Peasants. The book
detailed problems facing China's peasants, including abuse and over-taxation by
local authorities. A Party official in Anhui Province sued the publisher and
author in local court, arguing that the book had defamed him.74 After an initial
flurry of coverage in the print media, the Central Propaganda Department
banned further reporting on the case.7 ' Despite the ban, widespread discussion
of the case continued online-putting the court under pressure not to act too
obviously to protect the local official. Continued Internet postings also
highlighted the court's ongoing failure to resolve the case. s
The Investigation into China's Peasants case has yet to be resolved, and the
long delay suggests that the court either continues to struggle to determine how
72 Interview 2006-26.
73 In mid-2005, China's Central Propaganda Department issued new rules restricting "non-local
news." The rules, which ban local media from writing original news content on other jurisdictions
in China, is apparently a direct response to the widespread practice of non-local media engaging in
investigative reporting. Nailene Chou Wiest, Closing of Loopholes to Further Gag Media, S China
Morning Post (Online) (June 11, 2005), available online at <http://vww.asiamedia.ucla.edu/
article.asp?parentid=25640> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
74 Ruo Qiao, Authors of 'Investigation into China's Peasants"Are Suedfor Defamation and Refuse to Settle Out
of Court ("Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha" Beigao Mingu Qinquan Yuanshu Zuo.he Jujue Tingwai Hjie),
Chengdu Commercial News (Chengdu Shang Bao) (Feb 25, 2004), available online at
<http://www.booktide.com/news/20040225/200402250013.html> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
75 Beling Tightly Controls the Media before the Two Meetings, Bans 'Investigalion into China's Peasants"
(Laianghui Qian Beijing Yankong Yulun Fengsha "Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha'), Boxun Newsnet (Boxun
Xinwen Wang) (Feb 29, 2004), available online at <http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/
2004/02/200402291359.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author).
76 Exclusive: Letter to the Chief Judge from Pu Zhiqiang, Lanyer for the Defendants in the Investigation into
China's Peasants" Case (Bentai Dujia Huode "Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha" An Bianhu Liishi Pu Zhiqiang
Zhi Shenpanhang Yi Xin), Radio Free Asia (July 11, 2005), available online at
<http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shenrubaodao/2005/07/11/puzhiqiang/> (Chinese) (on file
with author).
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to handle the case, or has decided to ignore it. " According to a widely circulated
email written by the defendants' lawyer in April 2006, the court handling the
case has decided to leave the case unresolved and not issue any decision. But it
does appear that the continued attention to the case, in part via online media,
resulted in pressure on the court to follow procedural norms and not to act
immediately to protect local interests.
The Sun Zhigang, She, and Nie cases show how the combined efforts of
traditional and online media can force authorities to reopen cases and redress
longstanding injustices. Meanwhile, the Invesligation into China's Peasants case
shows how online media may help keep discussion alive when traditional media
are barred from such discussions, and how email can be used to spread news of
cases where reporting has been banned.
2. Intemet Populism
In the Sun Zhigang case, public pressure led to more attention to the
treatment of migrants within China. Media pressure, fanned by Internet
discussion, forced authorities to investigate the case, make arrests, and abolish
the detention system that led to his death. The case may have resulted in belated
justice for Sun. But it was less clear that those accused of being his killers
received fair trials. Public pressure resulted in rushed and closed trials of the
defendants, with court judgments that appeared preordained by Party leaders.
The trial in the case was held in June 2003, just six weeks after the case first
came to light. The Guangdong Province High People's Court affirmed the lower
court's decision in the case on June 27, and Qiao Yanqin, the principal
defendant, was executed the same day. 8
Only three official media outlets were permitted to send reporters to the
trial. Propaganda officials instructed other media to use only reports from the
official Xinhua News Ageng, and Internet portals were told to terminate
discussion of the case. Some journalists and other observers questioned the
fairness of the trial, arguing that the death sentence imposed on Qiao Yanqin
was excessive, and asked why charges had focused on a low-ranking nurse and
other inmates in the detention center, rather than on higher-ranking officials.
But such discussions were generally not permitted online or in print. Instead,
official accounts focused on praising authorities' speedy handling of the case,
77 Chinese courts encountering difficult or sensitive cases frequently either refuse to allow such
cases to be filed, or simply never decide such cases. For a discussion of the phenomenon, see
Lebman, China Q (forthcoming) (cited in note 41).
78 Final Decision of Sun Zhigang Case Affirms the First Trial Decision: Prindipal Crminal PQiao Yanqin is
Executed (Sun Zhigang An Zhongshen Weichi Yuanpan, Zhufan.Qiao Yanqin Bei Zhixing Sixing), People's
Daily Online (Renmin Wang) (une 27, 2003), available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/shehui/061/1939883.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author).
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and on the court's responsiveness to public opinion. 9 And in a final
development, the editors of the paper that originally broke the story of Sun
Zhigang's murder were later imprisoned, albeit for "unrelated" corruption
charges. "
In 2003, Liu Yong likewise found that angry online discussion of a case can
lead to execution. Liu, an organized crime boss, was convicted in the early 2000s
of a range of crimes, including organizing a criminal syndicate, bribery, and
illegal possession of firearms.8" An intermediate court in Liaoning Province tried
his case and sentenced him to death. On appeal in 2003, however, the Liaoning
High People's Court reduced his sentence to life in prison. One reason for the
reduction was the fact that Liu's confession had been obtained through torture.82
A Shanghai paper, Bund Pictorial, quickly questioned the reduction in
sentence.83 News of the court's decision spread rapidly online-one major
Internet portal ran a headline on its news home page, stating in large font "Liu
Yong Will Not Die." The media suggested that Liu's ties to officials in Liaoning
Province resulted in favorable treatment.84 Reporters criticized academics who
had written expert opinions-in return for sizable fees-in support of Liu.85
79 See, for example, The Ministr of Public Security: The Resolution of Sun Zhigang Case is Speedy, Determined
and Serious (Gong An Bu: Sun Zhigang Anjian De Chuli Shi Xunsu, Jianjue He Yansu De), Xinhua Net
(Xinhua Wang) (Aug 7, 2003), available online at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/weekend/2003-
08/07/content_1016300.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author).
80 Liebman, 105 Colum L Rev at 16, 19 (cited in note 25). The same newspaper, Southern Metropolitan
News, had also been the first to report on the SARS epidemic in 2003. Observers suggested that
the editors were punished for their coverage of both the Sun case and the SARS crisis.
81 SPC Decision in the Retrial of the Lau Yong Criminal Case (2003) Criminal Retrial No. 5 (Zuzgao Renmin
Fayuan Zaishen Liu Yong An Xingshi Panjue Shu (2003) Xing Ti Zi Di 5 Hao) China Court Web
(Zhongguo Fayuan Wang) (Dec 20, 2003), available online at <http://www.chinacourt.org/
public/detail.php?id=96393> (Chinese) (on file with author).
82 The court stated that it had reduced the sentence in light of the facts and circumstances of the
case and noted that torture could not be ruled out. The Provincial High Court Opinion is not
publicly available, but the decision is summarized in the SPC's opinion.
83 Li Shuming, Bund Pictorial: Questions on the Gang Leader Liau Yong's Reduced Sentence of Death uith
Reprieve (Waitan Huabao: Dui Shenyang Heibang Toumu Lau Yong Gaipan Sihuan De Zhy), Bund
Pictorial (Waitan Huabao) (Aug 21, 2003), available online at <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-
08-21/01351583471.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author).
84 Gao Yu, Why Is the Shenang Gang Leader Liau Yong So Aggressive: He has Godparents as Strong Backup
(Shenyang Heibang Laoda Lau Yong Heyi Ruci XiaoZhanq , Gandie Ganma Houtai Ying), Sanlian Life
Weekly (Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan) (Mar 8, 2001), available online at
<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/202847.html> (Chinese) (on file with author).
8s Zhang Hui'e, Legal Experts'Ana#.Ze Inte erence in Judicial Justice, Monster Baby is Born By the Malformed
System (Falii Zhuanjia LunZheng Ganrao Sifa GongZheng, jixing Zhidu Chansheng Guaitai), S Met Daily
(Nanfang Dushi Bao) (Oct 9, 2003), available online at <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-10-
09/11591884089.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author). In an online discussion forum on the
case, one posting claimed that each expert earned 300,000 yuan for writing in support of Liu
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Web discussion forums filled with angry commentary, denouncing Liu's
"lenient" treatment.
Following the public outcry, the SPC decided to rehear the case. The SPC
invoked a rarely-used procedure that permits the court to try de novo
questionably-decided cases.86 In a carefully scripted trial, Liu's case was heard on
a Friday. The court announced its decision-reinstating the death penalty-on
the following Monday morning. Liu was executed the same morning.
Media outlets and some academics described the decision as an appropriate
response to popular opinion.87 Various websites carried morbidly detailed
accounts of each step of the case-including, on the date of Liu's judgment and
execution, hourly reports that described the court judgment, transportation of
Liu to the execution ground, transportation of his body to the crematorium, and
then return of his ashes to his family.88 The sina.com page on the case included
links to more than one hundred articles and commentaries.89 Some declared the
case a victory for "public opinion."9°
The official media hailed the Liu Yong and Sun Zhigang cases as examples
of successful official responses to public demands demonstrating China's
progress toward a more just and democratic society. Yet subsequent cases also
Yong. The experts denied this. One of them told journalists that they received only 2000 yuan
each. Id.
86 Pursuant to the tishen, or "elevation and trial" procedures, the SPC can rehear cases decided by
lower courts even absent a request from the parties that they do so. One report stated that the
case was the "first ordinary criminal case" in which the SPC had used the procedures; one prior
known lishen case was the trial of the Gang of Four. Cai Wenquing & Fu Yang, Two Reasons for the
SPC to Retg the Liu Yong Case, Experts Claim It Reflects Major Progress in the Legal System (Gaofa Tishen
in'u Yong You Liang Da Yuanyin, Zhuanjia Cheng Ci Tixian Fa7,hi Jinbu), Beijing Evening News
(Beijing Wanbao) (Dec 17, 2003), available online at <http://news.sohu.com/2003/12/17/81/
news217048181.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author); SPC Retries the Leu Yong Case Today, Two
Big Questions are Waiting to be Resolved (Zuigao Yuan Jinri Tishen ''u Yong An", Liang Da Xuannian
Youdai Jiekai), Beijing Morning Post (Beijing Chenbao) (Dec 18, 2003), available online at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-12/18/content_1236925.htm> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
87 See, for example, Ouyang Bin, Internet's Impact (cited in note 47) (arguing that the death sentence
was reinstated due to the combined efforts of Internet and print media); Guo Lang, Internet
Growth in China (cited in note 46).
88 See, for example, Shenyang "Godfather of Black Socieoy" Leu Yong Is Sentenced to Death (Shenyang '-leidao
BaZhu" Len Yong Bei Panchu Sixing), Sina (Xinlang), available online at
<http://news.sina.com.cn/z/liuyongsy/index.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author); Shenyang
Leu Yong Case (Shenyang Len Yong An), Sina (Xinlang), available online at
<http://news.sina.com.cn/z/liuyongsy/1.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author).
89 Shenyang "Godfather of Black Sodety" Leu Yong Is Sentenced to Death (cited in note 88).
90 Xiao Yuhen, Sentencing Leu Yong To Death Is Also the Victogy of Public Opinion Sztpernision (Panchu Leu
Yong Siing Ye Shi Yulun Jiandu De Shengh), Sina (Xinlang) (Dec 22, 2003), available online at
<http://tech.sina.com.cn/me/2003-12-22/1447271669.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author).
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demonstrate that Party propaganda officials have become increasingly conscious
of the need to manage online discussion of cases, and not let public outrage go
too far. In two high-profile cases the authorities went out of their way to
demonstrate that public outrage expressed online would not necessarily affect or
change court decisions.
What became known as the BMW case began in 2003, when, in the
northeast city of Harbin, a peasant accidentally drove his onion-cart into a
parked BMW. The driver, a woman named Su Xiuwen, got out, and argued with
the driver of the onion cart, Dai Yiquan. After bystanders intervened, she
retreated to the car. She then unexpectedly put the car into gear, striking and
killing Liu Zhongxai, Dai's wife, and injuring several others.
At trial in Harbin, the issue was whether Su had intentionally or
accidentally put the car into forward gear. After a trial notable for its lack of
eyewitness testimony, the court ruled the killing an accident and imposed a
suspended sentence.
As news of the story spread, the reaction on the Internet was
overwhelming. Sina.com, a leading web portal, reported receiving more than two
hundred thousand web postings on the case-even more than the total number
of postings regarding the SARS crisis earlier in 2003.91 The class difference
between the owners of the BMW and the onion-cart drove public outrage, as did
the questionable nature of the trial. Many speculated that political connections of
Su, the wife of a prominent businessman in Harbin, influenced the outcome.
In January 2004 authorities announced that the case would be reexamined.
But authorities at the same time banned further reporting on the case and
ordered websites to terminate and remove discussions of the case. There seemed
to be a clear effort to establish that Internet rage would not overturn the verdict.
Three months later, official media announced that an investigation led by
the Heilongjiang Province Communist Party's Political-Legal Committee had
determined that the case had been correctly decided. Although official
statements declared that the court's decision in the BMW case had been upheld,
observers reported that in fact a number of persons involved in the case were
91 The Case of TMBMW" Hitting People Gets the Most Internet Reading Exceeding SARS ("'aomla" Zhuangren
An Wangshang Dianji Lii Weiu Di Yi Chaoguo Feidian), Xinhua Net (Xinhua Wang) Oan 8, 2004),
available online at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-01/08/content_1266893.htm>
(Chinese) (on file with author). Sina first reported on the case on December 31, 2003; ten days
later it reported 220,000 online comments. Guo Lang, Internet Growth in China (cited in note 46);
see also Zhang Shuang, Analysis of Hot Web Forums Phonomenon Regarding ' BMW Hitting
People" Event ("B aoma Zhuanaren" Shiian Zhong Wangluo Luntan De Huobao Xianxiang
Tanxi), News World (Xinwen Jie) (First Colume, 2004), available online at
<http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/2005/0905/11@011747.html> (Chinese) (on file with
author) (describing the on-line discussion forums of the case as "a miracle").
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sanctioned internally.92 The sanctions were never announced publicly.93 The
message can be read several ways. One possibility was that authorities did want
to protect Su, the driver of the BMW. But the clear message was that
malfeasance will be handled internally, and that Internet anger can not always be
allowed to dictate Party or court decisions.
A similar story came in 2005, when websites carried extensive discussion of
the case of Wang Binyu.94 Wang, a migrant worker, was sentenced to death for
murdering four people, including his construction site foreman and three family
members. Wang's case became famous nationwide following reports in the
Bei/ing News.95 He was a symbol of the hardship and exploitation faced by China's
millions of migrant workers. Wang killed his boss after he repeatedly failed to
pay him. Said Wang, "I want to die. When I am dead, nobody can exploit me
anymore. Right?" 96
Many online postings and articles took Wang's side, and argued that he
should be spared. 97 As with the BMW case, however, online discussion largely
stopped following a Central Propaganda Department instruction.98 Wang was
then quietly executed. Although news of his execution was posted to the official
China Court News website the day after his execution,99 domestic media did not
92 Interview 2005-45.
93 The driver in the case, Su Xiuwen, was subject to punishment but was not jailed. But the
investigation into the case apparendy led to other misdeeds being uncovered. Thus press reports
stated that as a result of the investigation into the BMW case, another woman, Han Guizhi, was
removed from office and tried for corruption. The Former President of the Heilongiiang Political
Consultative Conference Han GuiZhi is Removed from Office (Yuan Heilongiang Zbengxie Zbuyi Han Guiqhi
Bei Mian.hi Qianhou), Beijing News (Xin Jing Bao) (June 24, 2004), available online at
<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-06-24/03373503585.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author);
Han GuiZhi Will be Tried in Beijing First Intermediate Court, Several Family Members Have Been 'Double
Specified" (Han GuiZbhiJiang Zai Bei/ing Di Yi Zhongyuan Shoushen Jia.hong Shu Ren Bei Shuanggal), Legal
Evening News (Fazhi Wanbao) (Mar 24, 2005), available online at
<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-03-24/14156183789.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author).
94 For examples, see Last Wish of a Criminal Waiting for Execution: Paying Attention to Migrant Workers
(Siqiu Zuibou Yuanwang: GuanZbu Nongmin Gong), Beijing News (Xin Jing Bao) (Sept 5, 2005),
available online at <http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/2005/0905/11 @011747.html>
(Chinese) (on file with author); Yuan Xiaobing, In Depth: Peasant Worker Wang Binyu's Anger and
Sorrow (Shendu: Mingong Wang Binyu De Nu Yu Bei), S Met Daily (Nanfang Dushi Ban) (Sept 11,
2005), available online at <http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/tszk/nfdsb/
sd/200509110183.asp> (Chinese) (on file with author).
95 Last Wish of a Criminal Waiing for Execution (cited in note 94).
96 Yuan Xiaobing, In Depth (cited in note 94).
97 Fu Yingji, Twelve Big Pieces of News Deletedfrom the Chinese Internet in 2005 (cited in note 61).
98 Id.
99 Yang Chao, The Appeal in Wang Binu' Intentional Homicide Case is Decided (Wang Binyu Guyi Sbaren
An Er Sben Xuanpan), China Court Web (Zhongguo Fayuan Wang) (Oct 20, 2005), available
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report on it. Only after the case received attention in the New York Times did the
domestic media report on Wang's death.'00
From these leading cases, and from interviews with journalists, judges, and
academics, we can describe a general pattern. First, the growth of the Internet
has made it more difficult for courts to conceal information about cases, and
more likely that misdeeds will be noticed and reported. Judges state that courts
find it hard to conceal information about cases, which increases pressure on
courts to handle cases according to law. Courts and Party-state officials that
oversee the courts cannot be assured of their ability to silence discussion of
cases simply by issuing an instruction banning further reporting. As we've seen,
the three most famous cases of Internet influence-the Sun Zhigang, Liu Yong,
and BMW cases-all demonstrate how online coverage or discussion can
encourage Party officials to intervene. In all of the cases, reports in the print
media, reposted to major Internet portals, were enough to set off a chain-
reaction.
This, in turn, has led to a new type of Party-state intervention into the
operations of the legal system. The interventions come in response to outrage
on the Internet and are marked by a determination to resolve the matter quickly:
in the Sun Zhigang case, with the rapid arrest and trial of suspects and then a
choreographed closed trial; in the Liu Yong case with the SPC apparently being
ordered to rehear the case; and in the BMW case with the investigation of the
case by Party authorities).' At the same time, Party propaganda authorities
curtail any further discussion of the cases other than by officially-approved
sources-generally by requiring that the media only use dispatches from the
Xinhua News Ageny.' °2 Propaganda authorities also order web portals to remove
or ban discussion of the cases: one list of terms automatically filtered by one
Chinese blog service included both "Nie Shubin" and "Wang Binyu."' ' 3 In the
online at <http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=181959> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
100 Yuan Xiaobing, Wang Binyu Killed People (Wang Binyu Sha Ren), S Met Daily (Nanfang Dushi Bao)
(Dec 31, 2005), available online at <http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/zt/rdzt/
zgxwcd/200512310024.asp> (Chinese) (on file with author) (reporting on Wang's execution).
101 'The Case of Nie Shubin's Wrongful Execution" (cited in note 57).
102 Consider Fu Yingji, Twelve Big Pieces of News Deletedfrm the Chinese Internet in 2005 (cited in note 61)
(discussing restrictions on reporting in the Nie Shubin and Wang Binyu cases).
103 Keywords Used to Filter Web Content, Wash Post (Feb 18, 2006), available online at
<http/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/18/
AR2006021800554.html> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
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final step, official media declare the interventions and resulting decisions to be
successful examples of authorities responding to public opinion.
Given the possibility of public scrutiny leading to unstoppable pressure,
political intervention, and even possible punishment for judges, courts are taking
some preemptive action to better control information. In recent years, courts
have taken steps to restrict media coverage of cases, requiring reporters to
obtain court approval prior to attending trials. Courts frequently either draft
articles about cases in their court for the local media or require that all such
articles are screened by court officials prior to publication. Courts have also
retaliated against negative coverage, with both courts and individual judges filing
defamation lawsuits in response to critical media coverage. In addition, court
propaganda or research departments monitor online discussions of cases
104involving individual courts, sometimes via daily searches to locate discussions
of the cases in the media or in discussion forums. °5 Finally, while it is hard to
say for sure, courts may be more inclined to decide cases in ways that are less
likely to inflame the public, which in the criminal context often means applying
harsh sanctions.
The result is a strange, tense, and slightly rivalrous relationship among the
courts and the media, major Internet providers, and the Party-state. As we have
seen, the courts fear media reports that might result in popular outrage and
political intervention. The media, meanwhile, must balance the risk of
punishment if they go too far in reporting on sensitive cases with their desire to
maximize profit through aggressive or sensational reporting. Party-state officials
are concerned with maintaining stability-even at the cost of undermining their
claims to be emphasizing rule of law. Unfortunately, this complex web of
relationships cannot help but sometimes distract from resolving disputes fairly.
The fears of media attention, public reaction, and Party-state intervention do
make the legal system more accountable, just not necessarily to the parties
before the court.
B. COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICES WITHIN THE
CHINESE JUDICIARY
Until this point, this Article has focused on communications practices
between the courts and other actors, including the media, public, and Party-state
officials. We now turn to the results of interviews with Chinese judges, to see
104 Interview 2005-10.
105 In other areas, however, judges say that they are not concerned about Internet discussion of
pending cases, Interview 2005-10-perhaps because there is little such discussion in the less
developed areas of China's interior. See, for example, Interview 2005-12 (stating that there is little
online discussion of cases in Xi'an).
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how their communications practices have been affected by the Internet
revolution.
1. Traditional Communications Practices
To understand how matters are changing, we must first describe the
traditional communication practices within the Chinese judiciary. To generalize,
Chinese judges have operated in a context in which they had limited access to
horizontal information-information about how other similarly-situated courts
were doing their jobs. Instead, their primary source of guidance for handling
novel or difficult cases has been vertical--consultation with superiors, either
within the court hierarchy or in other Party-state institutions. Chinese judges
have also operated in an environment in which their access to information is
restricted in some respects and uninhibited in others. On the one hand, courts
have often had limited access to legal materials and the decisions of other judges.
Chinese judges not only knew very little about how judges elsewhere were
handling cases; in impoverished rural areas they also may have lacked easy access
to laws, regulations, SPC interpretations, and other normative documents. On
the other hand, judges have been relatively uninhibited in seeking advice on how
to handle cases from colleagues, superiors, Party-state officials, or academics and
experts outside the courts.
Since the start of the reform era in 1978, China's judges have worked in an
historically unusual legal environment. During the Mao era, and particularly
during the Cultural Revolution, many legal institutions were neglected, left to
play minor roles or used primarily as political tools of the state. During the
Cultural Revolution, the legal system ceased to function in any recognizable
form. Since 1978, great efforts have been made to improve and reform the
Chinese legal system. Much of the statutory law was either rewritten or drafted
anew. Judges, consequently, have been called on to apply a huge number of new
laws, which have often been vague or unclear. Yet despite reform, in many
regions judges have continued to lack even the basic legal materials required to
resolve cases. What might strike a foreign observer as the most important
sources of guidance-legal education, the laws themselves, and decisions of
other courts-have often been unavailable or at the least lacking in detail.
Limited access to information has not meant that judges confronting hard
cases have had no other sources for guidance. First, within individual courts,
adjudication committees provide guidance (or decide outright) difficult or
sensitive cases.'0 6 These adjudication committees, which include high ranking
106 The range of cases considered by adjudication committees varies substantially. In most courts
adjudication committees consider any cases in which the three-judge panel responsible for the
case can not agree on an outcome. In some courts adjudication committees consider all cases
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judges from the court, and sometimes procurators (who participate in
discussions in some criminal cases, but apparently do not have voting power on
the committee),0 7 serve as a venue for discussing challenging or sensitive cases.
This practice (which has both critics and supporters in China) results in cases
that are decided in the first instance by judges who have not heard the case. The
practice can be said to reflect the fact that the concept of judicial independence
in China refers to courts, not individual judges. In any case, in addition to the
formal adjudication committee, judges frequently consult informally with their
peers and superiors within courts. Court presidents, who are the most powerful
figures within individual courts (and who often lack formal legal training), play a
particularly important role in guiding decisions in cases that are perceived to be
sensitive or difficult.
Second, lower court judges have also traditionally sought guidance on
difficult cases by seeking advice of the superior court through the process
known as qingsbi, or "requesting instruction." Judges encountering a difficult or
novel question can contact the higher-level court-often by telephone or in
person-to discuss how the case should be handled in the court of first instance.
The qingshi practice, which bears some resemblance to an informal interlocutory
appeal, has been criticized for eliminating the point of an appeals process.0 8
However, it continues to be an important mechanism for judges seeking
guidance in difficult or potentially sensitive cases." 9 Chinese judges are evaluated
based in part on whether their decisions are affirmed or reversed on appeal; a
judge who gets a decision "wrong" can be fined or, in serious cases, removed
from office. It is thus easy to understand why judges might seek guidance from a
higher-level court prior to issuing a decision.
where a defendant has been sentenced to life in prison or death, as well as all cases in which the
panel decided not to impose a prison sentence on a defendant.
107 In China, procurators serve both as the prosecution and as supervisors over the legal system.
Technically, the procuracy is a judicial branch of equal rank to the courts. They are not only the
prosecution, but also have the power to force courts to retry cases where the procuracy thinks the
courts got it wrong. Organization Law of the People's Courts (Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa), arts 12,
14-15 (effective Jan 1, 1980, as amended Sept 2, 1983 and Oct 31, 2006).
108 See, for example, Wang Lin, The Judges Have No Boss Other Than Law (Faguan Chule Falii Jiu Meiyou
Bie De Shangsi), Beijing News (Xin Jing Bao) (Dec 3, 2003), available online at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2003-12/03/content_1210980.htm> (Chinese) (on file
with author).
109 Some courts in China recently have taken steps to restrict the use of qingshi procedures, requiring
that all such requests for guidance come in writing, or come from lower court adjudication
committees (rather than individual judges).
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Third, China is officially a civil law system and does not formally recognize
court precedent as such. As with other civil law systems,n ° however, written
cases and formal guidance from higher courts do play an important role. Official
advice as to how cases should be handled is disseminated through public
normative documents issued by the SPC-ranging from official interpretations
of laws to replies to questions or explanations concerning decisions in specific
cases-or by non-public instructions issued by the SPC or by provincial high
courts. Judges also learn of new legal information and of representative cases
through official publications. These include the People's Court News, the official
newspaper of the court system, which frequently highlights interesting or
noteworthy cases handled by lower courts, and the Gazelte of the Supreme People's
Court, which publishes official decisions and cases from the SPC. Numerous
collections of cases have also been published, some under the guidance of the
SPC that are designed to highlight "representative cases" that courts should
follow, and others by academics or individual courts. Some local courts have
published case collections, designed to serve as guidance for handling cases-
although such volumes have limited reach outside their local areas. A few for-
profit websites now also provide collections of cases.' There is no formal
system for publication of cases in China, nor is there a mechanism for searching
the cases that are made publicly available. Thus with the exception of
information in the People's Court News (which prior to the Internet was not
searchable), other similar publications, or the occasional published collection of
cases, judges had little information about how to handle cases other than that
passed down to them from superior courts.
Finally, senior judges in courts may also discuss cases with the local Party
Political-Legal Committee, or with representatives from local people's
congresses or government. This is particularly true in serious criminal cases, in
cases that have aroused widespread public attention, or in cases that touch on
important local interests.
This model, which depends heavily on vertical consultation with superior
courts or political officials, continues to predominate. However, today the
110 See John Bell, Judiciaries within Europe: A Comparative Review 69-70 (Cambridge 2006) (noting that
"in practice, even in civil law, there is an acceptance of the concept of 'a leading case', such that
particular lines of legal principle are commonly described by reference to the name of the leading
case which established them"); Mary Ann Glendon, Michael W. Gordon, and Christopher
Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions: Text, Materials, and Cases on the Civil and Common Law Traditions,
with Special Reference to French, German, English, and European Law 207 (West 2d ed 1994) ("Because
of the necessity to interpret and apply the so-called written law, the civil law systems are in a real
sense case-law systems"). See generally Rudolf B. Schlesigner, ed Comparative Law: Cases, Text,
Materials 643-51 (Foundation 5th ed 1988).
M Some of these sites claim to have tens of thousands of cases. In our interviews, however, not a
single judge mentioned ever having consulted such commercial websites to research cases.
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Internet is changing how many Chinese judges do their job. In the next section
we canvass how at least some judges use the Internet in deciding cases, including
some of the uses that may seem unusual from the perspective of practice in
other nations.
2. New Communications Practices
The use of the Internet by individual judges is beginning to transform
communications practices within the judiciary, and, consequently, how law is
both used and applied in China. Judges who once worked in isolation, without
either easy access to national laws or information about how similar cases were
handled elsewhere, now are able to access not only the law on the books, but
also how such laws are being applied and debated elsewhere.
The Chinese judges interviewed for this Article overwhelmingly
commented that they use the Internet to conduct research to assist them in
handling cases--especially in hard or novel cases. Perhaps the most interesting
outcome of such usage is the slow development of what resembles a non-
binding system of precedent in the Chinese legal system. Judges state that they
are developing "unwritten precedent" regarding how to handle cases." 2 They
note that doing so helps to reduce their workload when they encounter new legal
issues."3 Judges explain that they do not look to other courts' decisions as
"precedent," but rather only for the purposes of reference, or cankao.1 4 But even
this non-binding "precedent" may strongly influence decision-making.
The reported use of informal precedent dovetails with a rise in the interest
in using precedent in the Chinese legal system. Since early 2002, the Zhengzhou
Zhongyuan District Court has experimented with a "precedent decision" system
whereby the court selects important cases as "models.""' Similarly, the SPC has
within recent years begun referring to its model decisions as "legal precedent."
However, the Internet-driven use of informal precedent exceeds the scope of
these experiments.
Some of the greatest consequences of these developments may be for the
more remote parts of China. For example, judges from places like Qinghai
Province, in western China, explained that they frequently consult court websites
112 Interview 2005-85.
113 Interview 2005-12.
114 Id.
115 See Constructing a Case-Law System with Chinese Characterisic? A Precedent-Derision System Emerges from
ZhengZhou, China Newsweek (Sept 6, 2002), available online at <http://www.chinanewsweek.
com.cn/2002-09-06/1/357.html> (Chinese) (on file with author) (Center for Chinese Legal
Studies translation).
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in more developed areas of China to see how they have handled particular legal
issues."6
This is a break from traditional practice. Judges encountering new legal
questions have traditionally sought assistance from their superiors, either in their
own court, or in higher-ranking courts. The growth of the Internet suggests that
courts may increasingly be able to look horizontally, to courts elsewhere in
China, whereas in the past they would have sought assistance from those above
them.
Over the long-term, the development of an informal system of precedent
may significantly change the Chinese legal system. It may lead to a greater
confidence born of national consistency, and the authority of acting in concert.
That may in turn lead to greater institutional security and autonomy, as judges
rely on the strength of the judgment of others, as opposed to mere personal
judgment.
Yet the Internet is not only permitting the development of horizontal
interactions among judges, but it is also a mechanism for strengthening existing
vertical relationships in the courts, and perhaps even control over individual
judges by superiors within the courts. Numerous courts in China have
established internal court networks, designed to facilitate court work, improve
efficiency, and also strengthen oversight over individual judges. In sum, internal
networks show how the Internet may also serve the Party-state's interests in
control.
We first explore ways in which judges are using the external web, and then
turn to the impact of internal court networks.
a) Finding cases. The best place for Chinese judges to find useful cases is,
ironically, sometimes outside of the courthouse. Few judges in China have
access to the external Internet (the Internet as it exists in China) from work, as
many courts do not permit judges other than those in court propaganda
departments to access the external web from work.'17 In other courts, only the
court president has access to the external web."8 Such restrictions may derive
both from concerns that judges will waste time online, and from concerns that
116 See, for example, Interview 2005-09.
117 Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-18. See also Interview 2005-51 (stating
that at a district court in Beijing judges are not allowed to go online from their offices, but that
there is a computer at the court that judges can use to go online if they need to do so); Interview
2005-58 (stating that judges at the Beijing High People's Court do not have access to the external
web from their offices, but that they can go to the court library if they want to go online). In
economically well-off areas of Jiangsu Province, some offices have two computers-one for the
internal network and one for the external network. Interview 2005-63.
118 Interview 2005-64. In other locales vice presidents also have access.
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judges will use the Internet to reveal confidential or secret information." 9 But in
some courts, access to the Internet also appears to be a sign of status-akin to
having a car and driver-with only the highest ranking judges permitted to go
online from work.
Despite these restrictions, a great many judges say that they use the
external network to aid their decision-making, particularly to research legal
questions and to see how other courts have handled cases similar to those before
them. 20 In the central Chinese city of Xi'an, judges use the Internet to consult
cases decided by the SPC, and by the Shaanxi Provincial High People's Court, as
well as decisions from other courts."' In Shenyang, judges note that they consult
both the websites of other courts and media reports for information on cases. 22
Even in areas in which courts lack computers, judges state that they frequently
conduct online research when they encounter difficult cases. 23 Some judges
have access to the Internet at home; others go to web cafes. 24
As one judge put it, "the effect is huge.' 12' A judge working in a rural
county court in central China (which lacks both an internal network and access
to the external web) gave the example of determining how to apportion blame in
traffic accidents when both sides share liability. Going online, judges "found that
in Guangdong there is a standard for the whole province for this. ' ' 126 Although
not in Guangdong and thus not obligated to use the standard, the court decided
to use the Guangdong rule. "In the past we only looked at cases in our court"
for guidance, commented the judge. Now the court looks elsewhere. 27
On the external Internet, judges rely on the same tools that other
participants in the legal system use to build legal arguments. Summaries of cases
on China Court Web and the websites of individual courts, media reports, and
other sources give judges an idea as to how cases have been decided. Judges also
frequent prominent academic websites, including the Civil and Commercial Law
119 Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-77.
120 Interview 2005-09; Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-85; Interview 2006-36; Interview 2006-
76. See also Interview 2005-12 (stating that when judges encounter new types of cases they will
sometimes go online at home to see how other courts have handled the issue); Interview 2005-51
(judge stating that he will sometimes search online for information regarding how other courts
have handled similar cases).
121 Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-12.
122 Interview 2005-64; Interview 2005-65; Interview 2005-70; Interview 2005-85.
123 Interview 2005-95; Interview 2005-96.
124 Interview 2005-95; Interview 2006-49.
125 Interview 2006-34.
126 Interview 2006-35.
127 Id.
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Website of Renmin University.1 28 Judges say that it is often easier to locate legal
materials on the web than on internal court networks, which they say are often
incomplete or are infrequently updated. 129 Simply making it easier for judges to
locate binding law is an important development: in the past, judges often had no
easy way to locate relevant laws and other materials. As one judge explained,
courts often have one book for hundreds of people, making it difficult for
individual judges to actually locate materials. 3 °
The most significant examples of Internet research are in cases where the
law is uncertain, or in which judges face difficult legal questions. 3' Judges state
that they routinely search websites of other courts for examples of cases similar
to those before them. 32 For example, a judge specializing in intellectual property
cases in Beijing stated that judges hearing such cases will often look online to see
how similar cases have been handled elsewhere, including overseas.'33
Judges are not the only ones using the Internet in this way. Lawyers also
say they use the Internet to conduct research, and that they often will provide
judges with printouts of materials they locate online, including information
about similar cases elsewhere. 134 One lawyer recounted how, in a case in which
his client had been sentenced to death in the first instance, he located a
newspaper report regarding a case from the same city in which a defendant in a
similar case had been sentenced to fifteen years in prison, not death. The
appellate court then reduced the sentence.'35 Public interest lawyers say that they
have used websites to link plaintiffs and lawyers who are bringing similar cases
nationwide.'36 Lawyers say that law firm websites can also be useful for gathering
information about prior cases-and that they sometimes will print out materials
128 Interview 2005-65; Interview 2005-70.
129 Interview 2005-55.
130 Interview 2005-54.
131 Interview 2005-65 (stating that judges in Liaoning routinely look online when confronted with
new cases); Interview 2005-78 (stating that judges frequently use the Internet when they
encounter issues that existing law does not clearly govern); Interview 2005-84 (same); Interview
2005-82 (stating that judges will look online for cases, news reports, and academic articles when
they encounter new legal issues).
132 Interview 2005-17.
133 Interview 2005-49; Interview 2005-104. See also Interview 2005-58 (stating that Beijing High
People's Court judges frequently use the Internet to look for cases from overseas); Interview
2005-70 (stating that judges in Changchun will use the Internet to research developments
overseas).
134 Interview 2006-31; Interview 2006-45.
135 Interview 2006-17.
136 Interview 2006-25.
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from such sites to provide to judges. 37 Likewise procurators say that they
frequently use the Internet to conduct research where the law is unclear, in
particular in determining the appropriate crime with which to charge a
defendant.
Some courts appear to be particularly important sources of precedent.
Thus, for example, intellectual property divisions at the intermediate courts in
Beijing, or in Beijing's Haidian District (home to many technology companies),
are seen as being influential.'38 Likewise, judges in the interior say that they often
look for guidance to courts in Beijing and Shanghai-where judges are widely
regarded as being better qualified than in many other areas of China."'
The practice of using the Internet to look for useful precedent or other
guidance is among the most potentially significant developments in judicial
communications. However, for the most part, what it does is mimic what we see
in other legal systems, both civil and common law. In the next part of this
Section we discuss more novel ways in which Chinese courts are using the
Internet.
b) Innovations. Some of the ways courts use the Internet in China may strike
a Western observer as surprising or unusual. Here we discuss several examples
where judges have used the network in ways that appear distinct from the rest of
the world. The first examples involve using court websites for public relations
purposes.
In 2004, the Shiquan County Court in Shaanxi Province came under fire
from local media when it dismissed the case of migrant worker Xu Dengkai for
being eight minutes late for a hearing. Xu contracted silicosis from work at a
local factory and sued to challenge a labor arbitration award. The labor
arbitration committee had ordered that the defendant factory pay him 6,200
yuan (about $775), while Xu argued that he was entitled to 217,206 yuan (about
$27,000).141 On the date of the hearing, however, Xu arrived slightly late.' 4' By
137 Interview 2006-37.
138 Interview 2006-04.
139 Interview 2006-67.
140 Notice of Big and Important Cases 2005 (no. 1) (Da Yao Anjian Tongbao 2005 [Di Yi Qi]) (Feb 24,
2005), available online at <http://www.aaawww.net/select/selectl.php3?id=372207& userid=
24245> (Chinese) (on file with author).
141 Peasant Worker who Got Silcosis Through Working Withdraws Suit for Compensation, are Government
Offacals Suspected of Owning Stocks? (Mingong Dagong Huan Xifei Suopei Chesu, Zhengfu Guanyuan Shexian
Cangu?), Huashang News (Huashang Bao) (Sept 18, 2005), available online at
<http://news.huash.com/gb/news/2005-09/18/content_2222951.htm> (Chinese) (on file with
author); Zhang Lu, 'The Legal System" Should Not be Emotionless ('aZhi" Buying Leng Bing Bing),
Huashang News (Huashang Bao) (Jan 12, 2005), available online at <http://news.huash.com/
gb/news/2005-01/12/content_1564512.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author).
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the time he arrived, the court had already dismissed his case for failure to appear,
forcing Xu to forfeit 14,000 yuan ($1750) in court filing fees that he had already
paid.
142
The Huashang News, a leading commercial newspaper in the provincial
capital, Xi'an, wrote an editorial entitled "The Legal System Should Not Be
Emotionless." The newspaper argued that dropping the case was an unduly
harsh punishment for a litigant who was five minutes late. 4 1 It pointed out that
the plaintiff had to travel by train from outside the mountainous county to arrive
at the court by eight thirty. It also wrote that the worker was in poor health as a
result of the injuries he had suffered at work.'"
The court, slighted, turned to the Internet to defend itself online. Its first
act was to release a report that argued that it had handled the case fully in
compliance with the law. 4 1 Next, court judges responded to and debated with
critics on the court's public Internet message board. 4 6 One comment posted to
the court's electronic bulletin board urged the court to admit that its handling of
the case had been incorrect. In response, a court official wrote that because the
case was still on appeal it could not be said to have been incorrectly decided. In
another exchange, a posting complained that the case was "not readable." The
court thanked the poster of the message for the criticism, and stated that the
court needed to continue to strengthen its ability "to serve social stability and
development.' ' 47 Some of the court's postings were identified as coming from
the court president, while others appeared to come from other court officials.
Later on, the court backed down and permitted the plaintiff to refile the
case without having to pay the court fees a second time. Without mentioning the
142 Xue Feng & Mu Shi, Because of Five Minutes Late for Court, Hanyin Peasant Worker is Ruled to Have
Withdrawn His Claim for Compensation (Zhi Yin Kaiting 5 Fenzhong Nei Wei Dao, Hanyin Mingong Suopei
Zao Chesu), Huashang Web (Huashang Wang) (Jan 12, 2005), available online at
<http://news.huash.com/gb/news/2005-01/12/content_1564511.htm> (Chinese) (on file with
author); Notice of Big and Important Cases (cited in note 140). In most civil cases in China plaintiffs
are required to pay a filing fee that is a specified percentage of the amount in controversy.
143 'The Legal System" Should Not be Emotionless (cited in note 141); Peasant Worker who Got Silicosis
Through Working (cited in note 141).
144 Notice of Big and Important Cases (cited in note 140); 'The Legal System" Should Not be Emotionless (cited
in note 141).
145 See How Ankang Shiquan County Court Plunders Peasant Worker (Kan Ankang Shiquan Fayuan Zenyang
Lueduo Nongmingon) Shangxi Network BBS Chatroom (Jan 24, 2005), available online at
<http://bbs.sxtvs.com/printpage.asp?BoardlD=34&ID=48266> (Chinese) (on file with author)
(BBS chatroom). The court argued that the plaintiff had failed to provide an excuse for being late,
and thus the court's action was justified under China's Civil Procedure Law. Id.
146 Interview 2005-16; Shanxi Shiquan County Court Message Board, available online at
<http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c> (Chinese) (on file with author).
147 See id.
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controversy or criticism, the court posted a report on the case on its website as
an example of how the court was working to further the "advanced education"
policy of the Party. The court posted a picture of Xu to the court's homepage,
with a caption stating, "Our Court Carries Out Judicial Assistance in the Case of
Xu Dengkui."'48 The court noted that it had taken account of the plaintiffs
status as a worker from outside the county, and had therefore decided to waive
the court fee and schedule an afternoon hearing so that Xu would be able to
attend. The report also stated that the court had been praised by the parties to
the case and the media.
149
The Xu case is just one example of how courts use their websites for
public relations purposes. Hundreds of Chinese courts-ranging from the SPC
to rural county courts-have created public websites.150 Court public websites
frequently include information such as an overview of court work and
personnel, news from the court, and discussion forums."' Although urban
courts were first to establish websites, even courts in some rural areas have sites
that provide information about the court, judges, and cases.'5 2
Court websites focus on providing information about the court, largely to
educate the public about such work, and to achieve other propaganda goals. The
SPC's website, for example, includes news on the court, primarily focused on the
activities of court leaders; an introduction to each branch of the court and to
148 <http://www.sqfy.com/index.php3?file=4> (on file with author).
149 Shiquan County People's Court Maintains the Advanced Teaching of the Communist Pary (Shiquan Xian
Renmin Fayuan Zai Baochi Gongchan Dangyuan Xianjin Xing Jiaoyu), available online at
<http://www.aaawww.net/select/selectl.php3?id=378962&userid=24245> (Chinese) (on file
with author).
150 As of August 2006, the official China Court Web site included links to 110 other court websites in
22 provinces. Courts Online (Fayuan Zaixian), China Court Web (Zhongguo Fayuan Wang),
<http://www.chinacourt.org/fyzx/> (Chinese) (on file with author). The list, however, is not
comprehensive. Brief Introduction of China Court Web and Notice of Web Construction (Zhongguo Fauan
Wang Jianjie Ji Jianwang Xuh), China Court Web (Zhongguo Fayuan Wang), available online at
<http://www.chinacourt.org/other/detail.php> (Chinese) (on file with author). For example,
although an Internet search found that five courts in Shanghai had public websites, only one was
listed on the SPC website.
151 See, for example, Ankang Intermediate Court (Ankang Shi Zhongii Renmin Fqyuan), available online at
<http://www.akfy.org.cn> (Chinese) (on file with author) (website of Ankang Municipal
Intermediate Court).
152 Shaanxi Province Shiquan Couny People's Court (Shaanxi Sheng Shiquan Xian Renmin Fayuan), available
online at <http://www.sqfy.com/index.php3?file=4.php> (Chinese) (on file with author);
Interview 2005-14. See also Xingguo County People's Court (Xingguo Xian Renmin Fayuan), available
online at <http://xgxfy.chinacourt.org/> (Chinese) Jiangxi Province Xingguo County Court)
(on file with author); Hebei Province Gu'an Couny People's Court (Hebei Sheng Gu'an Xian Renmin
Fayuan), available online at <http://gaxfy.chinacourt.org/> (Chinese) (on file with author);
Shangdong Province Kenli Counoy Peopk's Court (Shangdong Sheng Ken# Xian Renmin Fayuan), available
online at <http://klfy.chinacourt.org/> (Chinese) (on file with author).
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each judge on the court; explanations, interpretations, replies, and other
normative documents issued by the court; selected decisions of the court (but
none from the past two years); model decisions from lower courts; and the
court's annual work reports to the National People's Congress." 3 The website
makes it easier to access the same type of information that the court already
makes publicly available through the People's Court News, the Court's Gazette, and
regularly published books of selected decisions from lower courts.
Another important and widely read site is the China Court Web, which is
discussed above."5 4 The China Court Web carries news articles regarding the
courts, laws and regulations, academic legal materials, and online discussion
forums and chatrooms regarding legal matters. The China Court Web is a
particularly important place for judges to read about what other courts are
doing-and to help find the informal precedent discussed above. The site is run
by the People's Court News, the official newspaper of the SPC, and thus is directly
under the supervision of the SPC. 5 The site includes both content in the paper,
and also a wide range of material that does not make it into the print version.
Lower court websites are similar. They focus on highlighting court work
and educating the public about such work, either through selected opinions
from cases or summaries of cases, as well as articles written by judges.'5 6 Cases
included on websites are generally selected by court propaganda officials with a
view to highlighting noteworthy or new cases."'
Few courts post all or even many of their decisions online. Indeed, only
one court is known to have done so: in 2000, the Guangzhou Maritime Court
announced that all of its decisions would be made available online.5 8 The court
website now includes 777 cases decided between 2001 and 2005. s9 Other courts
153 The website also includes links to pages covering court history and an online video, but both links
are empty. The site appears to be under construction, which may also explain the small number of
cases included on the site.
154 <http://www.chinacourt.org/> (Chinese) (on file with author).
155 See About Us (Guanyu Women), available online at <http://www.chinacourt.org/other/
aboutus.php> (Chinese) (on file with author).
156 See, for example, <http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/aljx/index.asp> (Chinese) (on file with author).
157 Interview 2005-63.
158 Guang.hou Maritime Court Posts Decisions Online (GuangZhou Haishi Fqyuan Panjueshu Shangwang), China
News Agency Website (Zhongxinshe Wangzhan) (Oct 12, 2000), available online at
<http://dailynews.sina.com.cn/society/2000-10-12/134098.html> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
159 GuangZbou Maritime Court Judgment Documents (GuangZhou Haisbi Fayuan Caipan Wenshu), available
online at <http://www.gzhsfy.net/writ/index.php> (Chinese) (on file with author). In a 2005
article, the court stated that it posts "announcements of cases, decisions and introductions to
judges" online. Guangzhou Maritime Court (Guangzhou Haishi Fayuan), Using Modem Information
Technology, Enhancing the Construction of Maritime Judicial Abifi_0 (Yunyong Xiandai Xinxi Jisbu, Jiaqiang
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have similarly pledged to make all cases available online, or all intellectual
property cases,'160 but such promises appear to have gone unfulfilled. 161 Most
courts continue to post only a small number of selected decisions or case
descriptions.
Finally, as is common in the West, court sites also provide information to
potential litigants-ranging from court rules and regulations, to explanations of
litigation procedures, to instructions on how to file cases and the risks and costs
involved in bringing lawsuits. 62 Other courts include hearing times, 163 selected
laws and regulations, 164  instructions regarding the formulation of legal
Haishi Sifa Nengli Jianshe), China Foreign-related Corn Trial Web (Zhongguo Shewai Shangshi
Shenpan Wang) (Nov 23, 2005), available online at <http://www.ccmt.org.cn/ss/
news/show.php?cld=6356> (Chinese) (on file with author).
160 For example, the Beijing High People's Court reported in 2003 that all intellectual property cases
from all courts in Beijing would be published online. Beijing People's High Court (Beijing Gaoji
Renmin Fayuan), Endeavor to Make the Being Court Net A Unique and Excellent Website (Nili Jiang
Beijing Fayuan Wang Bancheng Tese Jingbin Wang han), China Court Web (Zhongguo Fayuan Wang)
(Nov 28, 2003), available online at <http://www.chinacourt.org /public/detail.php?id=92553>
(Chinese) (on file with author). As of February 2006, the website included 863 decisions-
although it is not clear whether that number reflects all intellectual property cases in the
municipality. Judicial Documents-Intellectual Propery Cases-Patents (Zhishi Chanquan Anjian), Beijing
Court Web (Beijing Fayuan Wang), available online at <http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/
cpws/?sub=2> (Chinese) (on file with author).
161 A 2003 report stated that Beijing courts would begin publishing all decisions from all 3 levels of
Beijing courts online, and would thus become the "first courts in the world" to do so. Gua
Zhixia, All Beiing Court Decisions To Be Posted On-line from November, the First In the World to Do So (11
Yue Bei/ing Fayuan Caianshu Quanbu Shangwang, Cheng Sh!/ie Shang Shouh), Star Daily (Beijing Yule
Xinbao) (Nov 3, 2003), available online at <http://www.edisc.com.cn/bike/
viewnews.btml?id=16230> (Chinese) (on file with author). Yet as of February 2006 the court's
website listed only 15 cases other than intellectual property cases. Judicial Document-Other Cases
(Qita Anjian), Beijing Court Web (Beijing Fayuan Wang), available online at
<http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/cpws/?sub=8> (Chinese) (on file with author). See also Guangdong
Foshan Court Puts Decisions Online (Guangdong Foshan Fayuan Panjueshu Shangwang), S Met Daily
(Nanfang Dushi Bao) (July 1, 2003), available online at <http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/c/2003-07-
01/1059204196.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with author) (statement by Guangdong Foshan
Intermediate court stating the types of cases that will and will not be posted online). In an online
essay, Peking University professor He Weifang commented that he had found no court in China
that made all decisions available without modification online. See He Weifang, What's the Dificully
of Putting Decisions On-line? (Panjueshu Shangwang Nan Zai He Chu?), Law Thinker Web (Falv Sixiang
Wang) (Dec 15, 2005), available online at <http://aw-thinker.com/show.asp?id=3025>
(Chinese) (on file with author).
162 Interview 2005-70. See also Beijing Court Web (Beijing Fayuan Wang), available online at
<http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/bjfy/> (Chinese) (on file with author) (introducing the basic
functioning of courts in Beijing); <http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/ sszn/sscx.htm> (Chinese) (on file
with author) (explaining litigation procedures on the Jiangsu Court Network).
163 See, for example, <http://www.shezfy.com/OpenJudge.asp?show=week> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
164 See, for example, <http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/sszn/cyfl.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author).
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documents and examples of such documents, 6 ' and court legal notices.166 The
Shenzhen Intermediate Court includes a link to live broadcasts of selected court
hearings, although the system does not yet appear to be functional.6 ' Some
court websites also provide online mechanisms for citizens to file complaints
about the court168-although judges say few such complaints are filed.169
The growth of court websites reflects greater emphasis on public relations
and media management by China's courts.7 Courts have increasingly found
themselves coming under criticism, in particular from China's newly
commercialized media. Courts are also coming into conflict with other Party-
state institutions, including People's Congresses, procuratorates, and
administrative actors. Websites provide a mechanism for improving the
reputations and images of courts, and perhaps thus for raising courts' status in
their interactions with other official actors. Both the courts generally and
individual judges-in particular court presidents-have an interest in raising
their profiles with higher-ranking leaders and with the public. The development
of public websites also reflects rhetorical commitment by the courts to the
importance of boosting transparency as a means for raising popular confidence
in the legal system, and of boosting legal knowledge among ordinary people so
as to make the courts more accessible. Internet sites, and in particular court
news sites such as the official China Court Web, do make an enormous amount
of information available, both to other judges and to the public. Yet like the
embrace of the Internet by the Party-state more generally, the content on courts'
public websites also suggests a greater emphasis on managing information than
on making such information publicly available.
c) Judges online. In 2006, in the Shiquan County People's Court in Shaanxi,
an anonymous user posted a message advising the court to ignore a case brought
by an elderly woman against her granddaughter for financial support. The
165 See, for example, <http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/sszn/szgs.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author).
166 See, for example, <http://www.shezfy.com/BuletDetail.asp?id=586> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
167 Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court (Shenzhen Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan), Live Broadcasts of
Court Hearings Online (Wang Shang Kai Ting), available online at <http://www.szcourt.gov.cn/
tszj.php> (Chinese) (on file with author).
168 See, for example, Hainan High Court Constructs New Working Plaformi Hand in Hand with Cisco
(Hainan Gaouan Xieshou Sike GongZhu Ban'an Xin Pingta), eNet (Oct. 15, 2004), available online at
<http://www.enet.com.cn/article/2004/1015/A20041015352752.shtml> (Chinese) (on file with
author) (reporting that courts in Hainan Province have established an online web page through
which citizens may report on misconduct by court officials).
169 See, for example, Interview 2005-70 (stating that a court in Changchun receives few complaints
via its website).
170 Liebman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1 (cited in note 25).
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message was posted to the court's BBS chatroom, where court officials and
sometimes the court president respond to postings from the public (and where
the same court had previously defended itself in the Xu Denkai case). The
poster argued that that the plaintiff's daughter, an alternative source of support,
was alive and in another town. 71 The poster suggested that the grandmother was
treating the court president like her grandson-expecting him to provide
assistance simply because she was elderly.
In a posted reply, a court official stated that the court would do their best
to handle the case. Later, the court president himself responded. He stated that
he had resolved the case by contacting the local civil affairs bureau, and asking
the bureau to provide financial support. The court president acknowledged that
it was not the court's role to take such actions, but stated that he had done so
because the plaintiff was old, and because the plaintiff recognized the
importance of the courts. 72
As this example shows, Chinese judges sometimes venture onto public
websites to handle cases or discuss legal issues with members of the public.'73
Judges even frequent public chatrooms, such as those on China Court Web.
74
Most judges state that they will not discuss actual cases before them in online
forums before such cases are decided. But there are also examples of judges
using such discussion boards to help determine how to best decide a case."' In
one example, a judge reported how a colleague had used online discussions with
legal scholars and ordinary people to "obtain consensus" as to how a case
171 Shanxin Shiquan County Court Message Board, available online at <http://www.aaawww.net/
bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c=&infotype=&page=4> (Chinese) (on file with author);
<http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index.php3?userid=24245& c=&infotype=&page=4> (Chinese)
(on file with author) <http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/ index2.php?userid=24245&c> (Chinese)
(on file with author).
172 Shanxin Shiquan County Court Message Board, available online at <http://www.aaawww.net/
bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c=&infotype=&page=4> (Chinese) (on file with author).
173 See, for example, Ge Zhihao, Shanghai: Yangbu Court Internal Network Enhances Efficiengy (Shanghai:
Yanou Fayuan DeJuyuwang BBS Tigao Gongzuo Xiaoi), Shanghai Morning Post (Xinwen Chenban)
(Nov 17, 2004), available online at <http://news.chinabyte.com/396/1876896.shtnl> (Chinese)
(on file with author) (noting online meeting between judges and "Internet friends").
174 Interview 2005-65. Judges sometimes self-identify as judges in their postings on bulletin boards
and in discussion forums. See, for example, Yang Fan, Doubts on an Official Emberzlement Criminal
Case (Dui Yiqi ZhiwuQinZhan Zui De Zhiyi), China Court Web BBS (Fazhi Luntan) (Feb 8, 2006),
available online at <http://bbs.chinacourt.org/ index.php?showtopic=139693> (Chinese) (on file
with author).
175 See, for example, Zuoan Tiankong, An Administrative Case that I'm Adjudicating (Wo Chengban Yiian
XingZheng Anjian), China Court Web BBS (Fazhi Luntan) (Feb 21, 2006), available online at
<http://bbs.chinacourt.org/index.php?showtopic=141739> (Chinese) (on file with author)
(discussion by judge of case after decision, requesting comments from other participants in a web
discussion forum).
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should be handled.'76 He praised the use of online forums for facilitating
interactions between judges and the masses. And even judges who are cautious
about participating in online discussions regarding cases themselves said that
they nevertheless will sometimes consult such discussions when deciding
cases.
177
Judges also use email to help decide cases. Judges in relatively remote areas
say that they sometimes email leading academics to ask their views of particular
legal issues. 178 This already was the practice in major cities like Beijing, where
judges frequently consult with academics when they encounter new or difficult
legal issues. The growth of the Internet makes it easier for judges in less
developed areas to do the same. 7 9 As an extension of the informal precedent
system described earlier, judges say that they also sometimes use the Internet to
locate courts that have encountered similar legal issues in the past, and then
telephone the judges who handled the cases to discuss how they reached their
decisions. 8'
Finally, in recent years, some judges have begun blogging. Web sites such
as the China Court Web include blogging sections, where judges discuss a variety
of issues, including general views of their work and also sometimes particular
legal issues.' 8' Some judges appear to be using blogs to advance their own
careers-writing in ways that highlight their own work (and how they advance
the Party-state's goals for the legal system). Many of the blogs appear to serve a
mixture of education and propaganda goals. Thus, for example, Judge Wu
Jinpeng, a judge on the Henan Province High People's court, used his blog to
describe the court proceedings in a capital case-describing how the court held a
public hearing on appeal, and how such proceedings received praise from all
parties, including the defendant, who thanked the court for its fair handling of
176 Interview 2005-82.
177 Interview 2006-34.
178 Interview 2005-65.
179 In Shenyang, the largest city in northeast China, an official document from the intermediate court
stated that consultations with experts should be done by telephone, letter, fax, email, orally,
through seminars and lectures, or through other appropriate means. Working Methods of Shenyang
Intermediate People's Court's Expert Consultation Group (Shenyang Shi Zhong/i Renmin Fauan Zhuanjia
Zixuntuan Gongzuo Banfa) (Nov 17, 2004), available online at <http://cdfy.chinacourt.org/
public/detail.php?id=1386> (Chinese) (on file with author). The document, however, only refers
to cases in which an official decision has been taken by the court to request the views of an
expert; in reality judges in China also consult informally with outside experts.
180 Interview 2005-49; Interview 2005-51; Interview 2005-77.
181 See <http://blog.chinacourt.org/> (Chinese) (on file with author) (homepage for blogs on the
official China Court Website).
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his case.'82 Another judge, identified as Lan Cai, discussed cases ranging from a
dispute over an insurance contract, to a claim brought by local residents
challenging an administrative regulation.'83 A judge writing under the name
Judge Song Zhumei used a blog to discuss criminal cases, asking, in one case,
whether particular facts should be treated as an accident or as giving rise to a
charge of criminal negligence.8 4 And a judge writing under the name Jia Mu
used a blog to discuss a range of civil cases, including a claim of harassment via a
cell phone message and a medical malpractice case.'
All of these cases appeared to be examples of already decided cases-
judges do not appear to blog about pending cases. Moreover, none of the judges
interviewed for this Article mentioned blogs as an important source of
information in deciding cases. This is not surprising; the use of blogs in China
has exploded during the period in which we conducted our research. But it does
appear that blogs are emerging as another important mechanism through which
judges both share information about cases before them, and perhaps also
interact with the public and the legal community regarding interesting or novel
cases.
In sum, Chinese judges are experimenting with a variety of new ways of
using the Internet to either handle their legal duties or conduct public relations.
The long-term implications of these activities are not clear. Nevertheless, China
may serve as an interesting case study for the rest of the world.
3. Internal Networks
Use of the external Internet and the development of court public websites
represent just one aspect of how Internet technology is changing China's courts.
One reason most judges are not able to go on the external Internet from work is
that many Chinese courts have constructed internal court networks (another is
that many basic level courts lack computers).
The developments we describe above regarding how judges use the
Internet have gone largely unnoticed in academic and media writings in China.'86
182 <http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profilel.php?p=34042&author=130> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
183 <http://bog.chinacourt.org/wp-profilel.php?cat=3&author=1494> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
184 <http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profflel.php?cat=3&author=5008> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
185 <http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profilel.php?cat=3&author=529> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
186 One exception is an interview with us about our research in Procuratorate Daily, one of China's
leading legal newspapers. Lu Hui, American Scholars' Discussion about "Chinese Legal Research"-The
Impact of the Internet on Judges and the Rule of Law (Meiguo "Zbongguo Fa Yanjiu" Xuezhe Tan--Hulian
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The Chinese media have, however, covered in detail the development of internal
court networks-networks that can be accessed only by court personnel. These
networks, known in Chinese asjuyu wang, generally link judges within a particular
court; in some more developed areas they link lower courts with higher courts.
In some respects internal networks provide similar types of information and
opportunities for interaction that are provided on the external Internet: judges
have easier access to laws and regulations and some selected cases than in the
past and, in some courts, can share their views about cases with other judges in
chatrooms. Internal networks, like the external web, make it easier for judges to
do their jobs.
Yet the information on such sites is limited to that selected by court
officials, and thus is often far less comprehensive than what is available on the
external Internet. Judges using internal networks are limited to seeing those
materials that their superiors want them to see. In addition, internal networks are
also an important mechanism for monitoring work by individual judges. In this
respect courts' use of the Internet may be seen as a parable for China's embrace
of the Internet more generally: more information is available, and judges are able
to do their jobs more efficiently (and, one hopes, more fairly), but the Internet is
also serving the state's interests in imposing oversight and control.
In a 2002 notice, the SPC instructed all courts in China to set up networks
or individual computers with software allowing judges to search laws and other
legal materials.187 Courts have gradually complied with the notice. Reports in
2003 and 2004 on the development of the Internet in China's courts stated that
500 to 600 of China's approximately 4000 courts had established internal
Wang Dui Faguan Ji Fa.hi De Yingxiang), Procuratorate Daily (iancha Ribao) (uly 24, 2006),
available online at <http://www.jcrb.com/nl/jcrb1004/ca530254.htm> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
187 The SPC Notice on Printing and Circulating the "Regulation on the Administration of the
Establishment of the People's Court Computer Information Network System" and the "Plan for
Establishing the People's Court Computer Information Network System" (Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa "Renmin Fayuan Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo Xitong Jianshe Guanli Guiding"
He "Renmin Fayuan Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo XitongJianshe Guihua" De Tongzhi) (an 29, 2002),
available online at <http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/LawData/flfg2002/gfsfjs/2003-
02/19/1518560846.html> (Chinese) (on file with author) (stating that all courts should establish
internal court networks in order to improve management of cases and case statistics; in theory the
networks should connect provincial courts to the SPC). In 2002, the SPC instructed all provincial
high courts and intermediate courts to establish court networks by 2003 and to link such
networks to the SPC's network, and instructed all local courts generally to establish court
networks by 2005. Id. The SPC does not appear to have made public more recent data on
progress toward meeting such goals.
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networks.'88 Many more courts appear to have set up internal networks since
then, or are in the process of doing so.
Discussions of the role of internal networks focus on their role in making
courts more efficient. Thus, for example, reports have noted that developing
internal networks raises court efficiency by strengthening information
management and "leadership methods" in the courts.'89 Reports have also noted
the importance of court networks in facilitating supervision of lower courts by
higher courts. 9 '
Not surprisingly, courts in economically developed areas have taken the
lead in developing such networks.' In Jiangsu Province-one of China's
richest-a 2006 report noted that computer networks had been established in
116 of the province's 123 courts. 92 Yet courts in less developed areas-ranging
188 Brief Introduction to Technology Criteria for the Establishment of the People's Court Information Network System
(Renmin Fayuan Xinxi Wangluo Xitong Jianshe Jisbu Gufan Tusbu Neirong Jianjie), available online at
<http://www.law-lib.com/shopping/shopview-p.asp?id=1 1349> (Chinese) (on file with author);
Beijing Huaxia Telecommuncation Technology Ltd., Plan and Construction of the National Courts'
First Level Special Network Video Conference System (Quanguo Fayuan Xitong Yi Zbuanwang Sbipin Huyi
Xitong De Guihua YuJiansbe), China Multimedia Video Comm (Zhongguo Duomeiti Shixun) (Mar
5, 2004), available online at <http://www.cmvc.com.cn/list.asp?id=338> (on file with author)
189 Brief Introduction to Technology Criteria (cited in note 188); Plan and Construction of the National Courts'
First Level Special Network Video Conference System (cited in note 188). See also Hanbin Court
Establishes Internal Computer Network (Hanbin Fayuan Jiancbeng Jisuanji Juye Wang), People's Court
News (Renmin Fayuan Bao) (May 10, 2003), available online at
<http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=49783> (Chinese) (on file with author)
(stating that the presence of a court network improves efficiency and quality of the court); Zhang
Yigao, Laisban Internal Network Expedites Trials (Laishan Juyu Wang Wei Shenpan Tisu), People's
Court News (Renmin Fayuan Bao) (Mar 27, 2002), available online at
<http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/pubfic/detail.php?id=35107> (Chinese) (on file with author)
(noting how a court network has improved efficiency).
190 See, for example, Pei Cong, Lbasa Cbengguan District People's Court Internal Network Construction Passes
Inspection (Lasa Shi Cbengguan Qu Renmin Fayuan Juyuwang Jiansbe Tongguo Yansbou), China Tibet
Court Web (Zhongguo Xizang Fayuan Wang) (Aug 15, 2005), available online at
<http://tibet.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=506> (Chinese) (on file with author) (noting
the important role internal networks play in facilitating lower courts' reporting to higher courts).
191 The 2003 SPC notice instructing courts to provide networks or computers on which judges could
search for laws and other relevant materials stated that the costs of such infrastructure should be
borne by individual courts. See SPC Office Notice on Promoting and Furnisbing the "China Adjudication
Law Apph'cation Support System" (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Bangong Ting Guayu Tuiguang Peibei "Zbongguo
Shenpan Falii Yingvong Zhichi Xitong" De Tong h:) (Nov 4, 2003), available online at
<http://www.courtpress.com/subject/sl.php> (Chinese) (on file with author).
192 Pushing for the New Development of All Courts in the Province (Fenli Tuidong Quansbeng Fayuan Gongzuo
Xin FaZhan), Jiangsu Legal News iangsu Fazhi Bao) (Feb 15, 2006), available online at
<http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/fydt/fyyw/fyyweswl.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author); Brief
Introduction to the Courts in the Province (Sheng Fauan Jianjie), Jiangsu Court Web (iangsu Fayuan
Wang), available online at <http://www.jscourt.gov.cn/fyjj/index.htm> (Chinese) (on file with
author).
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from Heilongjiang in the northeast to Tibet-have also developed court
networks and have publicized their use in increasing both efficiency in and
supervision over local courts.'93
Many basic level courts, in particular in rural areas or county towns, lack
networks or computers. 94 Judges at a rural county court in Jilin Province
reported that the only people in the court with web access are the court
president and the vice-presidents; judges have no access to either an internal
network or to the external web."' Only court leaders have computers. 9 6 Judges
at both a county and an intermediate court in the central province of Hubei
commented that they lack any web access, and that many courts lack computers.
In general, internal networks have four primary functions. First, they
provide searchable databases of laws, regulations, some cases, and other binding
normative documents. Many courts include a database of national and local laws
developed in conjunction with the SPC, the People's Court Press, and the
Chinalawinfo Center at Peking University.'97 The database includes SPC
193 InformationiZed Instituions (Xinxihua Jigou), Heilongjiang Province Information Center (Heilongjiang
Sheng Xinxi Zhongxin), available online at <http://www.hljic.gov.cn/xxhsd/xxhjg27.asp>
(Chinese) (on file with author) (discussing the establishment of internal court networks in sixty
courts in Heilongjiang Province, and noting the role of the provincial high court in inspecting and
overseeing internal networks in lower courts); Pei Cong, Lhasa Chengguan District People's Court
(cited in note 190) (discussing the establishment of an internal network at a district court in Lhasa,
the first in the Tibet Autonomous Region, and emphasizing the importance of the network in
managing the acceptance, adjudication, and enforcement of court opinions); see also Hainan High
Court Constructs New Working PlaOform (cited in note 168) (stating that all courts in Hainan Province
have been equipped with internal networks). In some areas court networks connect higher courts
with lower courts under their jurisdiction, although this appears to be primarily the case in more
developed areas. In Changchun, for example, the intermediate court is linked via an internal
network to both the provincial high court and to lower courts. Interview 2005-70; Interview
2005-84. In Xi'an, however, as of mid-2005 the intermediate court's network was separate from
and not connected to the internal networks at lower courts. Interview 2005-10.
194 Interview 2005-09.
195 Interview 2005-95.
196 Id. See also Interview 2005-83 (stating that in many rural courts in Jilin there is only one
computer for each court, and there is often no internal network); see also Interview 2005-18
(stating that some local courts in Xi'an lack the resources to provide computers for all judges).
197 "China Judidal Law Appicaion Support System" Order Invitaion Form ("Zhongguo Shenpan Fali Yingyong
Zhichi Xitong" Zhengding Dan), The People's Court Press (Renmin Fayuan Chubanshe), available
online at <http://www.courtpress.com/subject/index-5.php> (Chinese) (on file with author);
Interview 2005-18. See also Interview 2005-55 (stating that the legal materials available on
internal sites is purchased from the SPC). In 2003 the SPC issued a notice instructing all courts to
purchase a database of laws produced by the People's Court Press. SPC Office Noice on Promoting
and Furnishing the "China Judicial Law Applicalion Support System" (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Bangong Ting
Guau Tuiguang Peibei "Zhongguo Shenpan Fali Yingong Zhichi Xitong" De TongZhi) (Nov 4, 2003),
available online at <http://www.courtpress.com/ subject/sl.php> (Chinese) (on file with
author). It is not clear, however, what percentage of courts have actually done so. According to
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interpretations, replies, and other documents, as well as some cases. 98 Internal
networks thus provide judges with electronic forms of the types of materials
they have traditionally consulted in deciding cases, making it easier for judges to
access such materials.199 Judges also receive information about new laws,
regulations, and interpretations via notices on their internal court networks.200
Over time, how, why, and by whom the information included on internal webs
is collected may have a major impact on how courts function and apply the law.
Controlling information on internal networks-which the SPC is doing by
requiring all courts to use standardized software-is also a mechanism for
controlling how judges decide cases.
Second, some court internal networks include discussion forums in which
judges discuss topics ranging from new cases to the quality of food in the court
cafeteria.2"' These forums are similar to those that exist on the external web, but
are accessible only to judges from a particular court or courts. In some courts
judges comment that such discussion forums are rarely used to discuss
substantive matters.20 2 In others, however, such as in Jiangsu Province, judges
say that such internal discussion forums-which are accessible to most judges in
the province-have become important forums for discussing new legal issues
and, occasionally, pending cases. 2 0' The system includes numerous discussion
forums, moderated by individual judges, where judges can discuss cases (and
other issues) anonymously.2 4 One judge noted that the forums allow judges to
one report, the database is in use in all courts in Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian, and Guangxi; in
another fourteen provinces it is used by some courts. Warm Congratulations for the "China
Adjudicaion Law Application Support System" Winning the 'Third National Electronic Publications Awards"
(Relie Zhube "Zhongguo Shenpan Falii Yingyong Zbichi Xitong" Ronghuo 'Di San Jie Guojia Dianqr
Cbubanwu Jiang'), Peking University Law Information Web, available online at
<http://chinalawinfo.com/ad/courtpress/index.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author).
198 Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-12; Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-18.
199 Interview 2005-63.
200 Interview 2005-70.
201 See, for example, Chen Shaoquing, Yubuan People's Congress Issue General No. 194 (Yubuan Renda
Zong Di 194 Qi) Yuhuan People's Congress Web (Aug 9, 2005), available online at
<http://www.yuhuanrd.gov.cn/newsshow.php?show-id=986> (Chinese) (on file with author)
(emphasizing the use of an internal court network for judges to exchange views with each other
and with the court vice presidents responsible for their division of the court).
202 See, for example, Interview 2005-79 (stating that court chatroom is rarely used); Interview 2005-
65 (stating that judges in Shenyang rarely use the internal BBS); Interview 2005-2102 (stating that
Beijing judges rarely use their discussion forums to discuss cases).
203 Interview 2005-63.
204 Interview 2005-58. See also Interview 2005-70 (stating that judges in Changchun will sometimes
discuss difficult cases on discussion forums on their internal network, but generally only after the
case has been decided).
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learn about new developments, both in China and overseas.05 Likewise, all
judges in Shanghai can participate anonymously in discussions on the Shanghai
court web, which links all courts in the city.20 6 In addition, the Shanghai Second
Intermediate People's Court's internal network includes a section in which
judges can discuss "difficult legal questions" that they encounter in cases. The
discussion is also accessible to judges in lower courts under the intermediate
court's jurisdiction. A report on the court's website stated that court officers can
discuss abstract legal issues encountered in individual cases. The court also
organized a team of experienced judges to provide information in response to
such abstract questions.20 7
As we have noted, Chinese judges frequently discuss cases that are under
consideration with their peers and superiors, including superiors in higher
courts. Discussing pending cases on discussion forums is thus an electronic
version of the forums of vertical consultation that already exist. Yet such
discussion forums may also facilitate debate in which judges might be less willing
to engage face to face with other judges or with their superiors. For example,
one report on the Liu Yong case 20 8 recounted how judges on the Liaoning
Province High People's Court had discussed the case on their Internet network
while it was under consideration-but did so anonymously out of concern for
retribution.209  Nevertheless, such discussion takes place in a controlled
environment, one in which only court personnel participate, and one that is
monitored by court superiors. It may be that judges are more willing to
participate in such discussion when they know it is unavailable to the public. On
the other hand, judges may also be wary of speaking too freely in a system run
by the courts with an explicit goal of boosting oversight of judges.
205 Interview 2005-58; Interview 2005-77.
206 Interview 2006-57; Interview 2006-76.
207 Zhu Yong & Pan Sishen, When Judges Encounter Dificult Questions in Adjudicating Cases: Court Website
Offers Discussion Space (Faguan Shenpan Anjian Yudao Nanti, Fayuan Wangzhan Tigong Yantao Kongian),
Shanghai Youth Daily (Shanghai Qingnian Bao) (Apr 7, 2005), available online at
<http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/42734/43194/3302092.htnl> (Chinese) (on file with author).
All responses must be approved by the intermediate court's research office; the intermediate court
will not respond to questions that reveal facts relating to individual cases. Interview 2006-45.
Judges in other areas likewise state that they will sometimes use the internal web to discuss
pending cases, in particular in courts where every judge has his or her own computer. Interview
2005-83.
208 See text accompanying notes 80-89.
209 Zhang Yue, Court Opinion Reform Advances Judicial Transpareny, Independence of Judges Needs to be
Enhanced (Panjueshu Gaige Licu Touming Shenpan, Faguan Dulixing Youdai Tigao), Oriental Outlook
(Liaowang Dongfang Zhoukan) (July 6, 2005), available online at <http://www.china-
judge.com/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=3267&BigClassID=17& SmallClasslD=25 &SpecialID=0>
(Chinese) (on file with author).
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Third, internal networks serve to disseminate information to judges, in
particular about recent court developments. Internal websites sometimes include
representative cases from provincial or municipal high courts, as well as notices
and interpretations from such courts.2 1 ° Local court leaders also sometimes
include specific materials or cases from their own court on their internal
websites.2 n These materials are designed to inform and educate judges; such
cases are often selected because they either are particularly good examples and
21are thus worthy of study, or they carry a particular message. 12 Thus, for
example, in Beijing, courts can view interpretations from the Beijing High
People's Court, as well as those from the SPC. The Beijing High Court posts
descriptions of important decisions (but not court decisions themselves) on its
internal website for judges in the city to review.213
Fourth, and arguably most important, internal networks facilitate oversight
of individual judges and even courts. In many cases it appears that the networks
have become a significant mechanism for higher-ranking judges to monitor the
work of those below them. In so doing, internal networks reinforce the
hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of China's courts. Many internal court
networks provide information regarding the status of cases, such as party names,
dates on which cases were filed or dates of scheduled hearings, and whether a
case has been resolved. In most cases, such information is available only to
judges handling such cases and their superiors,214 although in some courts all
judges can view such information.215 In others, however, such information is
available only to court superiors; judges complain of being required to enter
extensive administrative information regarding cases into the computer system
which they themselves cannot even access. The monitoring function is backed-
210 Interview 2005-70 (stating that in Changchun, the internal network at the intermediate court
includes internal notices and announcements to judges, as well as a database of laws). See also
Interview 2005-104 (stating that court networks are used to distribute notices and other
information to all judges in Beijing); Lu.hou Intermediate Court Opens Forum on Internal Network
(LuZhou Zhongyuan Juyuwang Shang Kai Luntan), People's Court News (Renmin Fayuan Bao) (June
21, 2004), available online at <http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/ public/detail.php?id=70984>
(Chinese) (on file with author) (noting the usefulness of a court internal network for
disseminating notices and other information to judges).
211 Interview 2005-10.
212 Interview 2005-77 (stating that internal websites also sometimes include descriptions of cases or
opinions in selected cases that court education and propaganda officials have decided to post).
213 Interview 2005-58.
214 Interview 2005-12; Interview 2005-63.
215 Interview 2005-49. See Administrative System for Court Pmceedings (Fayuan Ban'an LIucheng Guanli
Xitong), available online at <http://www.spsp.com.cn/chinese/products/chanpcx-dzzw_
fy01.htm> (Chinese) (on file with author) (noting the use of court networks to improve
management of case information).
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up by other technology. In some courts in Beijing and Shanghai, court
presidents, vice presidents, and heads of individual divisions can watch live
video streams of the proceedings in any courtroom under their jurisdiction.216 At
the SPC, all judges are required to log in to the court network as soon as they get
to the court, so that superiors can monitor who has arrived at work.217
Court judgments are likewise usually available only to a limited number of
judges and court officials. In a few courts it appears that all judges with access to
the internal network can view all or most decisions from their own courts,218 but
most networks only allow court leaders to view decisions (other than those
selected by court propaganda officials as worthy of posting on the network).219
As one court president explained, decisions are not generally available on the
internal website because they are "secret., 220 Thus court presidents and vice
presidents often can view all cases in their courts, and heads of divisions within
courts can view decisions in their division, but ordinary judges have access to
only those cases they have decided.22' As one judge in an intermediate court put
it, each judge in the court is allowed to view different information depending on
his or her status.222 In addition, in some jurisdictions in which networks connect
lower and higher courts, some higher court judges are able to view decisions in
lower courts in their jurisdiction.223
In Beijing, for example, only high-ranking judges can view decisions. The
situation in Beijing is noteworthy in part because it marks a departure from the
216 Interview 2005-48; Interview 2005-58; Interview 2006-36; Interview 2006-76. See also Luzhou
Intermediate Court Opens Forum (cited in note 210).
217 Interview 2005-2103. See also Yuhuan People's Congress Issue GeneralNo. 194 (cited in note 201).
218 Interview 2005-09 (stating that at one intermediate court in Qinghai judges at the court can use
the court's internal network to view all cases decided at the court); Interview 2005-65 (stating that
judges in one court in Shenyang may view judgments in already decided cases on the court's
internal website).
219 Interview 2005-49 (stating that although individual judges may be able to access certain
information regarding cases not before them in their court or division within the court-such as
the date of such cases and the names of parties-they do not have the ability to access opinions);
Interview 2006-76 (stating that only senior judges can view decisions).
220 Interview 2005-12. See also Interview 2005-18 (stating that the internal website of an
intermediate court in Shaanxi includes no cases).
221 Interview 2005-70; Interview 2005-47; Interview 2005-48. In practice, this may not be a
significant bar to judges obtaining information: judges seeking information about previously
decided cases can also obtain information by asking their colleagues. Id; Interview 2005-102
(stating that judges can ask their division heads if they want to see additional materials).
222 Interview 2006-76.
3 Interview 2005-47 (stating that in some courts in Beijing the court network allows both higher-
ranking judges and judges at the Beijing High People's Court to view decisions from lower
courts).
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more open system that was in place when the Beijing courts first created an
internal court network. At the time, judges could view all cases decided by any
court in Beijing.224 Judges could also view cases in their own courts in which they
were not involved.225 The Beijing High People's Court altered the system,
creating instead a system that permits only higher-ranking judges to access such
information.2 6 The progression in Beijing appears to represent a more general
trend. As court networks have developed, courts have become more
sophisticated about both the type of information provided and the degree to
which higher-ranking judges are able to use the system as a tool for oversight.
It would be wrong to view efforts to use technology to improve oversight
of judges as entirely pernicious. As we have noted, there are many problems in
China's courts-including corruption, incompetence, and other forms of
malfeasance. If internal networks are able to ensure that cases are heard and
decided on time-within the time limits stipulated in law-it would be a major
step forward for the fairness of the Chinese system. The same is true with
having live images of court proceedings available to court superiors: the fact that
proceedings are on camera may reduce incentives to engage in obvious
misconduct. In this regard, however, the development of court internal networks
reflects the development of the Internet in China more generally. Restricted
access to the Internet serves the state's interests in oversight and control. But
restricted access may be better than no access, and in the legal system it may
mean courts that function more fairly, more efficiently, and more consistently.
III. JUDICIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND JUDICIAL POWER
What is the relationship among how a judiciary communicates and its
position in society? What can we learn from the Chinese example about the
relationship between judicial communications, judicial power, and the rule of
law?
We suggest a central and important tradeoff for the Chinese or any legal
system in a cheap speech environment. First, in a country with a weak judiciary,
the ease of criticism made possible by cheap communications technology can
pose a serious threat to the legitimacy and power of the courts, and threaten
progress toward a consistent rule of law. In more developed legal systems, where
the judiciary is stronger, such effects may be weaker, and the salutary aspects of
criticism more obvious. However, in countries with less developed legal
224 Interview 2005-49.
225 Interview 2005-47.
226 Id; Interview 2005-58 (stating that the heads of court divisions can view case details of cases in
lower courts).
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institutions, the power of mass, directed, and cheap criticism to weaken judicial
institutions is much clearer.
The criticism born of greater informational freedom can correct injustice,
prevent corruption, and otherwise ensure a more fair legal system. But at the
same time it can also destroy what little power and autonomy weak courts may
have. Where the courts lack authority, the media and courts may become rival
institutions, set on a course of repeated conflict. That is what we have seen in
China, where courts and the media each contend that their view of the law and
the facts is the correct one, and where each claims that the other is beset by
corruption and incompetence.
But the same cheap communications can also be used to build judicial
power. The easier it is for judges to communicate, the easier it is to develop a
consistent set of rules across the country. Cheaper communications make it
easier for courts to apply the law consistently-a major and often overlooked
problem (at least in Western writing on Chinese law).227 That, in turn, gives
judges the power to appeal to the potent principle that similar cases should be
decided similarly. Stated differently, we suggest here that judicial "herding,"
while considered dangerous by some of the American literature, 8 may be a key
component of constructing judicial power.
Horizontal networking among judges also makes it easier for judges to
cumulatively improve the law-by passing on best practices to others. It also
facilitates the development of professional identity, which may be key to
developing the ability to resist external pressure. Those improvements will
further strengthen judicial claims to legitimate resolution of cases.
A. JUDICIAL POWER
The source of judicial legitimacy and power presents one of the oldest
questions in law and political science. What gives courts their political power?
The question is not easy to answer. The judiciary, whether in China or other
countries, typically lacks either the legitimacy of an elected body,229 or the
command of coercive physical force (like that of an army) to enforce its will.
227 For discussions of inconsistent application of law, see, for example, Zhang Weiping, The Function
and Structure of Legal Heaings in Civil Litigation (Minshi Susong Falui Shen De Gongneng Ji Gou!ao), 5 Leg
Stud Res (Faxue Yanjiu) (2005), available online at <http://www.civiUaw.com.cn/weizhang/
default.asp?id=2291 0> (Chinese) (on file with author); Yu Dongai, Precedent Legal System? Precedent
System?: A Specious Judicial Question (Panli Fa Zhidu? Panli Zhidu?: Yige Si Shi Er Fei de Sffa Wenti),
Pub Law F (Gongfa Pinglun), available online at <http://www.gongfa.com/yudapanlifa.htm>
(Chinese) (on file with author).
228 See text accompanying notes 36-39.
229 In the United States the majority of judges are elected. However, the most powerful judges,
including all federal judges, are generally appointed.
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The judiciary's power to make others obey must derive from an appeal to some
other source of authority and legitimacy. Invariably judges lay claim to be
enforcing some higher principle that transcends the case before the judge.230 The
exact principle may vary across cases, legal systems, and eras. A judge may claim
to be effectuating the commands of the legislature, deciding the case the same as
a similar case, enforcing basic principles of morality, or perhaps implementing a
divine will. The strength of those claims will vary across time and among places.
But what these claims have in common is an appeal to an authority beyond the
personal discretion of the judge, and a hope that, thanks to the claim, the judge's
decision will be obeyed.
From this perspective, a judiciary's power can be said to stem from at least
two social factors The first is how broadly any principle upon which the
judiciary might rely is accepted, both by other parts of government, who may
have to enforce the ruling, and by the public at large, who choose whether to
comply. A second is, even granting the existence of accepted principles, the
capacity of the judiciary to assert the claims in the first place, a question that may
depend on access to resources. For example, a judge who lacks the relevant
statute books will have trouble claiming, as a matter of principle, that she is
faithfully implementing the will of the legislature.
Let us turn to the Chinese example, where the courts are weak, both
constitutionally and in actual practice, and discuss what makes their claims to
higher principle difficult. First, among the simplest claims of principle a court
can make is that it is obeying the written law. Yet even that most basic claim is
complicated by the vagueness and confusion in many Chinese laws, and by
overlapping claims to authority by various Party-state institutions. Meanwhile,
courts in poorer areas sometimes lack basic legal texts, let alone Internet access.
Similarly, judges, especially in rural areas, may lack the legal training necessary to
articulate their claims to legitimacy.231
Second, as we have already discussed, courts in China have been isolated
and largely unaware of what other, similar courts are doing. This deprives the
courts of another of the most obvious principles from which they can claim
230 This argument is made in many forms in many places. See, for example, James B. Thayer, The
Orgin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129 (1893); Wechsler, 73
Harv L Rev at 1 (cited in note 7); Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 49-56 (cited in note 7).
231 See He Lili & Zhang Shouzeng, Resolve the Problem of Full Payment ofJudge's Salary in the Way that Late
Payment of Education Funding is Resolved (Yao XiangJiejue Tuoqian Jiaoyu Jingei Nayang Ji iue Hao Faguan
Gong# Zu'e Fafang Wenti), China Court Web (Zhongguo Fayuan Wang) (July 1, 2004), available
online at <http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=121608> (Chinese) (on file with
author) (reporting official comments on the poor conditions and low salaries in local courts);
Liebman, China Q (forthcoming) (cited in note 41) (discussing inequalities among courts in
China).
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legitimacy: doing what other courts have done. The decisions made by Chinese
courts, consequently, have lacked the consistency that might form the basis for a
claim to legitimacy and fairness.
Without recourse to these more obvious claims to legitimacy, a popular
default, as other Chinese scholars have noted, is for Chinese courts to make the
claim to be effectuating the will of the Party-state.232 However, the relatively
unclear legitimacy of the Party-state itself, along with its control over the courts,
means that the authority that may be derived from such claims may be weak. In
practice, it appears that injustice in individual cases, and inconsistent application
of the law, are widely viewed as undermining popular confidence in the courts.
What our study adds to this discussion of judicial power is a new
appreciation of how judicial communications may affect the claims to authority
that judges may make.233 Cheaper communications can both weaken and
strengthen judicial power.
B. NET JUSTICE
The blogger theory discussed in Part I makes the classic point that cheaper
speech ought to improve government performance. Much of the argument is a
high-tech version of the classic view of free speech presented by John Stuart Mill
in On Libery, suggesting the now seemingly obvious merits of having orthodoxy
challenged by heretical opinion.234 In its high-tech manifestation, the idea is that
the government will commit a given number of wrongful acts. Due to resource
limits and agenda, traditional media will only expose a percentage of these errors.
In theory, the sheer increase in the number of critics empowered by Internet
technology will lead to more government misdeeds being uncovered-in the
sense that a nation equipped with more fly-swatters will kill more flies.
Writers like Thomas Friedman and Nicolas Kristof rely on blogger theory
and predict that in authoritarian regimes such as China, cheap speech ought
similarly improve government performance-or even lead to the downfall of
such regimes. Whether that is actually happening or not is the subject of an
ongoing debate. Both of us, in other work, have discussed this subject,
emphasizing a loss of specific control yet a maintenance of overall control over
232 See Liebman, China Q (forthcoming) (discussing court commitments to "socialist rule of law"
theory and to maintaining social stability) (cited in note 41).
233 As noted above, there are historical parallels to recent developments in China, in particular in the
important role that printing played in facilitating the development of common law courts. See text
accompanying note 4.
234 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 50-52 (Norton 1975).
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political debate within China.23 More wrongs are being exposed in China, but
this does not necessarily mean the Party is any less in control than in the past.
What we have learned in this study sheds further light on this debate.
Blogger theory prizes criticism as a remedy for bad governance, which means
that the cheaper it is to criticize, the better. This study shows the limits of these
views-and urges a better understanding of the role of cheap Internet criticism.
We uncover the problems of directed criticism, in particular, of attacks on a
weak judiciary in an environment where criticism of other government actors is
more effectively barred.
An important assumption of the free speech theory discussed above is that
the government actors in question are powerful enough that criticism will, in the
end, improve performance. Yet matters may be different when some but not
other forms of criticism are allowed and when the criticized actors are weak and
face ongoing legitimacy problems. In that context, the public criticisms made
possible by cheaper speech can erode the ability of judges to act, in effect, as
judges. It can weaken their capacity to act independent of public and political
opinion, and weaken the courts' power relative to that of other political actors.
We have seen in this paper that criticism of the judiciary helps maintain the
power of the Party. Net-fueled rage provides new reasons and justifications for
individual Party-state officials to intervene in the operation of the legal system.236
Although sometimes the Party-state will prop up, as opposed to reverse, a
judge's decisions, either way, it is the Party-state, not the courts, that has the
final say. Whatever legal authority might have existed is replaced with a political
decision made by the Party-state. This creates incentives for the public and the
media to appeal to Party-state actors to intervene in cases with which they
disagree. It also encourages courts to align their decisions with what they believe
will be Party-state leaders' views.
For judges, political intervention can be embarrassing, and carries the risk
of more serious sanctions if decisions are viewed as incorrect by court or Party
superiors. In China, in politicized or sensitive cases, the threat of political
intervention has always been a check on the power of the courts. Preordained
outcomes and Party intervention have long been a feature of the Chinese legal
system. The new concern, however, is a type of political pressure that is born
235 See Liebman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1 (cited in note 25); Goldsmith and Wu, Who Controls the Internet
87-104 (cited in note 5).
236 We recognize that the Party-state is far from monolithic in its views, and that speaking of the
Party-state as a single institution obscures many important differences within the Party. In some
cases intervention furthers the interests of local party-state officials; in others, top leadership of
the central Party-state intervene at the expense of local officials. Our point is not to suggest that
such differences are irrelevant; it is to show that the Internet is in some cases facilitating oversight
of and interference in the courts by a wide range of actors at various levels of the Party-state.
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not of the narrow political or financial concerns of the Party or of individual
Party officials, but of the broader set of issues that inflame public opinion. What
is new is the possibility of intervention not only for politically sensitive cases, but
for simply unpopular decisions.
At its worst, cheap mass criticism may lead to a legal system where Internet
reaction serves as a kind of alternative appellate review. The case of Liu Yong's
execution comes closest to that extreme, one that Chinese commentators have
compared to the court-free mass justice of the Cultural Revolution. But more
ominous still are the cases like Lu Yong's that never come to light, because the
courts do not dare practice leniency for fear of the public reaction.
Courts have several means of trying to avoid such interventions, but most
lead in unfortunate directions. First, courts facing cheap mass criticism have
every reason to try and prevent the media and Internet sites from stirring up
controversy. The result is the spread of false or controlled transparency in
China's courts. The courts, as we are seeing, have used new technology and the
commercialization of the media to spread positive reports about their own
work.237 They are also making it harder for journalists to cover court
proceedings. The emphasis China's courts have put on managing media relations
and the flow of information to the media in recent years reflects both the power
of the Chinese media and the Internet, and judges' beliefs that media
intervention in cases is often illegitimate and unhelpful. The courts thus are now
trying to exert more influence on the media, much as the media have tried to
influence the courts.
Second, given that courts cannot always control media coverage, courts
have an incentive to try to decide cases in a manner least likely to inflame public
opinion or attract media attention. As we have said, the real question is how
often courts fail to decide cases like the Lu Yong case for fear of public outcry.
It goes without saying that such self-conscious efforts to avoid unpopular
decisions are a far cry from deciding cases fairly.238 Instead, the courts may
engage (like the media itself) in a judicial version of a self-censorship--or make a
deliberate effort to guess what outcomes the media or ultimately the Party might
prefer.
What we are saying can be misinterpreted as suggesting that a judiciary is
better off absent any external criticism. None of this is meant to suggest that
237 See, for example, Ni Shouming Sends Words to Our Web: Enhance Management and Posiivey Develop (Ni
Shouming Jjyu Benwang Jiaqiang Guanli fiji Fa Zhan), Hebei Province Gu'an County People's Court
(Hebei Sheng Gu'an Xian Remin Fayuan) (Mar 31, 2005), available online at
<http://gaxfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=94> (Chinese) (on file with author) (court
official discussing importance of the Internet).
238 Interview 2005-10.
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there is no positive side to the new criticisms of China's courts. The optimistic
face of web justice is (half) of the Sun Zhigang case, where public attention
demanded government reform, or the Nie and She cases, where Internet
coverage helped to pressure the SPC to revise procedures for capital cases. We
do not advocate further restrictions on speech in China. The problem is not with
the courts or the media, but rather lies in hypersensitivity to public option and
concerns regarding "social stability" among Party officials, and a resulting
unwillingness to refrain from intervening when law and public opinion conflict.
The points discussed here have obvious implications for other developing
countries, as well as for legal systems with more robust courts. The blogger
theories developed in the West have their limits, particularly when the
development of the judiciary is at issue. In many developing countries with weak
judiciaries, it must be understood that cheap mass criticism of the courts alone
may hinder, rather than aid, the development of an independent judiciary. The
case of China shows how important it is for media to respect a judiciary's role in
society, and for courts and other state institutions to be able to resist the
temptation to yield to public rage. The spectacle of the Internet manhunt as a
kind of appellate court of public opinion may have reached an extreme form in
China. Yet no legal system can afford to ignore similar dangers.
This discussion also highlights a crucial difference between cheap speech
and free speech. Many observers of China mistake the present volume of speech
(cheap speech) as reflecting an inevitable trend toward free speech, when
actually the two are distinct. Speech may be cheaper in the new China but at the
same time only modestly freer, for while the volume of criticism may be
growing, much is in permitted directions. The media has some freedom to incite
virulent public attacks on the judiciary (cheap speech), but not to question the
legitimacy of Party rule (free speech). Indeed, the very fact that there remain
significant restrictions on speech may be what makes permitted forms of
criticism so extreme. That is why when we warn of the dangers of cheap speech
to the power of the Chinese judiciary, we are not discounting the value of free
speech in the political system. We claim only that cheapening speech along one
dimension-mass criticism of an already weak judiciary-may not be a healthy
development.
C. JUDICIAL NETWORKS
Cheap speech may make it easier to ignite populist campaigns against the
judiciary. But, as compared to print media, the flip side of Internet
communications is that it they can make it easier for judges to learn about and
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rely on each other's decisions-giving a new basis for claims to independence
and legitimacy. The changing costs of information, stated otherwise, affect both
the independence and the accountability of Chinese judges in new ways.
Judges who are aware of the decisions of others may make claim to a
central principle: that like cases be decided alike. There is obviously far more to a
legal system than the "like cases" principle. Nonetheless, the idea that if a case is
not different in relevant particulars from a case already decided it should be
decided in the same manner is an important starting point.
239
The recent American literature on judicial precedent cascades, discussed in
Part I, has largely warned of the dangers of blind obedience to the decisions of
other judges. Our study leads us to a conclusion that is nearly the opposite:
imitative behavior may be a crucial route for the Chinese courts to develop their
power and autonomy. We argue here that the rise of horizontal communications
within the judiciary may slowly give individual judges and courts more
confidence in their decisions, as they create more uniformity and consistency
within their courts and across the country.
What happens when it gets easier and cheaper for judges to know what
similarly situated judges are doing or have done?24° A judge now has a new
source of (external) information, namely, the decisions made by other judges
who faced the same problem.241 This setting-a set of sequential and similar
decision makers facing a similar problem with imperfect information-contains
the basic components of the main economic models of herding behavior.242 And
given basic assumptions, the prediction is that judges, like any other actors, will
rationally value the information on what other decision-makers did in similar
circumstances, or at least count it in addition to local information.243 Even
239 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 176-224 (Belknap 1986); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Nature Of The Common Law 10-12, 170 n 29 (Harvard 1988); Robin West, Re-
Imagining Justice: Progressive Interpretations of Formal Equality, Rights, and the Rule of Law 107 (Ashgate
2003).
240 By assumption, the "other judges" are not superior courts or in any kind of vertical relationship,
but equals or higher-ranking courts in other jurisdictions whose decisions are not formally
binding in any way.
241 The idea of such a change in technology is not far-fetched--as various historians have pointed
out, the common-law system may have only begun to function well after the invention of the
printing press, which offered, among other things, a cheaper means of finding out what other
judges had done in similar circumstances.
242 See, for example, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, Learning from the Behavior of Others at 152-
53 (cited in note 37); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behaior, 107 Q J Econ 797
(1992).
243 See Daughety and Reinganum, 1 Am L & Econ Rev 165-68 (cited in note 38); Talley, 73 S Cal L
Rev at 87 (cited in note 40).
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without a binding rule of stare dedsis,244 we might expect the knowledge of what
other judges have done to have an effect on judicial decision-making. Certainly
this is the case in other civil law systems that at least formally lack a principle of
stare dedsis.245 This is a complex way of saying that judges will value the acts of
other judges as a source of information as to the right decision.14 As Professor
Eric Talley writes, as judges "learn information from previous holdings, they
may rationally begin to treat such holdings as binding on them, even if not
formally required to do so, and even f the case they actually hear suggests a
contrary outcome.
' 24 7
Most of the American literature on herding and the judiciary presents the
possibility of precedential cascades as a threat to the legal system. The argument
is that judges may begin to blindly obey what others have done with little regard
as to the correctness of the rule adopted. Yet whether this is really a problem
depends on the legal system under study. Where consistency and a basic rule of
law are taken for granted, herd behavior may be a problem. But where the
judiciary is weak, and its decisions inconsistent, herding may be an important
political strategy. Our theory suggests that information about similar cases-
even if not acknowledged as precedent-may make it easier for courts elsewhere
to reach similar decisions. The greater availability of information and debate may
also make it more likely that courts in different areas of China will apply the law
consistently. Courts are increasingly looking for guidance horizontally, to peer
courts in other jurisdictions, rather than only looking to their vertical superiors.
The fact that judges are increasingly looking horizontally to each other also
suggests the possibility of ground-up development of law and courts, greater
244 Compare Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Dedsis, 65 Chi Kent L Rev 63
(1989).
245 See discussion in note 110 (discussing case law in civil law systems).
246 A number of writers in information economics discuss why decision-makers (usually in financial
markets) will rationally place weight on the decisions made by others in similar situations. One
reason is the possibility that the earlier actors knew something-among Choice A and B, they
possessed private insight or information suggesting that Choice A was preferable. A second is
simply a preference for conformity-that most people prefer to do what others have done, either
because it reduces mental strain, protects their reputation, or avoids the risk of being criticized.
For these and other reasons, see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 12 J Econ Perspectives at
152-53 (cited in note 37). An important point is that we might expect imitation both in the
absence or presence of a formal precedent system. For one thing, production of rules is part of
the business of the judiciary-so that a judge who does what others have done might be a good
judge. Another reason is that judicial power may also be maximized by consistency among
judges-a united front that deters political meddling. Third, and maybe the most important for
most judges, following may just be easier. It is much easier for judges to do what others have
done-in jargon, it minimizes decision costs.
247 Talley, 73 S Cal L Rev at 94 (cited in note 40). Talley goes on to specify some of the ways that a
legal system can mitigate some of the negative side-effects of precedential cascades.
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expansion of court autonomy, and perhaps increased professional identity
among judges. All of these may over time encourage courts to further develop
their own ability to resist external pressure.
We can present this discussion a different way. As we discussed above, the
legitimacy and power of courts stems in part from their adherence to higher or
neutral principles.248 In a mature legal system, it can be easier to find such
principles, whether they be the "rule of clear mistake" allowing the judiciary to
correct obvious errors made by the legislature and executive, the principle that
like cases be treated alike, or some other principle. Yet in a developing legal
system the search for such rules may be more difficult. That is why the simplest
principle of all-acting as other courts or judges have done-is so important. 249
Lacking any other particular claim to legitimacy, the judge may at least say that
the court is acting in a manner consistent with what other courts have done.
Courts and legal systems that treat like cases alike would appear both more
deserving of and more likely to receive public trust.
A further component of the advantages of judicial networking for judges is
the possibility of innovation toward better rules. In a world where judicial
communication is difficult, an innovative decision-either a novel resolution of
an unclear legal issue or a decision that appears to challenge existing laws or
norms-often went unnoticed. Today, some such cases become lively topics of
debate online-allowing both lawyers and judges elsewhere to become aware of
such decisions. 2 0 Courts may be more willing to innovate when they know that
courts elsewhere in China have done the same. And to the extent judicial
networks improve the law in ways that prove popular, judges may lay claim to
greater authority and prestige.
The implications of this China-focused discussion for the rest of the world
should be clear. Empirically, scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter have
documented the rise of cross-border contacts and networking among judges.251
Slaughter's work on judicial networks describes the increasing practice of judges
in different countries paying attention to each other, and each other's decisions,
in a way that is influential despite being non-binding. What courts in both
international and Chinese judicial networks are seeking is the same. They seek
248 It stems from these, along with, as Alexander Bickel argued, the power to avoid making decisions.
See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 49-65, 111-199 (cited in note 7).
249 See, for example, Katsh, 8 Nova L J at 649 (cited in note 12) (noting, with regard to printing in
England, that "as court decisions began to be printed and distributed, pressure arose for national
uniformity and equal treatment regardless of place").
250 For a discussion of innovation in the Chinese system, see Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation
47 Harv Intl LJ at 36-39 (cited in note 41); Liebman, China Q (forthcoming) (cited in note 41).
251 Slaughter, A New World Order at 66-103 (cited in note 8).
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the additional power and legitimacy that is the product of judicial conformity.
That judges in China and around the world should both seek the comfort of
reliance on what other courts have done should be no surprise.
We close this discussion with three caveats. First, our findings are
predictive rather than conclusive; we are suggesting that horizontal networking
by Chinese judges presents one possible route to strengthening the position of
China's courts within the existing political system. Second, the position of courts
in Chinese society is the product of many factors, most importantly Party-state
policy. Third, the interviews conducted for this Article do not permit overly
broad conclusions regarding how many judges use the Internet, or the degree to
which such use of the Internet is fostering informal precedent. Certainly not all
judges go online; those who do so tend to be younger, educated, and
accustomed to using computers. Many judges in China's courts are older and
have had no formal higher education prior to joining the courts. One judge
noted that only those judges who are "responsible" will bother to conduct
online research.252 Another judge stated that those judges who do have Internet
access are more likely to use the Internet to play online games than they are to
conduct legal research.2 3 Despite these caveats, we are confident that changes in
how judges communicate will, over the long-term, affect the operation of the
Chinese legal system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The dramatic drop in the costs of communications represented by the
Internet revolution has had effects on the world both predictable and
unpredictable. In North America, Japan, and Europe, it is the media and
entertainment industries that have faced the most radical challenges. But it
stands to reason that not every country will change in the same ways. In China,
this study shows that the legal system is one area where changing informational
practices seem to be having long-term transformative effects, with important
lessons for the rest of the world.
The perennial question is whether China's Internet revolution is facilitating
the "rule of law." We see mixed results. At its best, judicial networking may
strengthen the confidence and autonomy of individual judges, as they network
with their peers. Net justice may also be used as a corrective against judicial
malfeasance and corruption. But as for the delicate issue of external, political
scrutiny of judges, matters may be getting worse before they start getting better.
As one of us has noted elsewhere, at the end of the day raising the status and
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authority of courts is not something courts can do on their own.254 The central
Party-state does not appear interested in fundamental changes to the power of
the courts. What is emerging, however, is a new and confusing dynamic between
a commercial media, better trained judges who are beginning to aspire to the
roles played by judges elsewhere, Party-state officials, and a reactive public. We
do not claim to understand the full implications of that dynamic for the rule of
law in China.
The case study of China yields important lessons for the legal systems in
developing and developed countries. Every country has a de facto speech
environment surrounding its judiciary-a mixture of informal and formal rules
that control how judges speak, and how people speak about judges. What we
learn from the study of China is how vital these speech practices can be for a
healthy and fair legal system. The speech norms by which a judiciary lives by
may be vital to its power, and their erosion cannot be taken lightly.
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